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ABSTRACT  
ESSAYS ON GENDER AND MICROFINANCE  
BY 
SHAGATA MUKHERJEE 
August 2017 
Committee Chair: James C. Cox  
Major Department: Economics 
This dissertation consists of three essays exploring the heterogeneity of gender 
differences in behavior across contrasting societies. Are women naturally wired to 
behave differently than men or is it the social context in which the gender roles operate 
that motivate their behavior? I study this question in the contexts of risk, trust, and 
trustworthiness, moral hazard and repayment behavior in microfinance. I use the 
approach of conducting controlled field experiments in neighboring matrilineal and 
patrilineal societies in rural India. The two societies differ in gender roles but are 
comparable otherwise. Understanding the societal and cultural factors that drive gender 
differences in behavior helps to prescribe optimally-targeted policy designs. 
The first essay evaluates the universal policy of gender targeting to mitigate 
microfinance loan defaults and studies the reasons for such gender differences in default. 
I design and conduct microfinance field experiments with individual and group liability 
treatments in comparable matrilineal and patrilineal societies in India. I observe a 
reversal of gender effect on loan default across the two societies. I find that women have 
a lower default in the patrilineal society but higher default in the matrilineal society 
compared to their male counterparts. I also find that group liability leads to moral hazard 
among the individual group members but reduces overall default due to risk sharing 
 among them. My results suggest that while women are better clients on average, a 
universal policy of gender targeting to reduce defaults in microfinance might be 
suboptimal. 
The second essay builds on the findings of the first essay that group liability 
contracts lead to moral hazard among the borrowers. In this essay, I evaluate the policy 
of gender targeting to mitigate moral hazard problems in microfinance and study the 
underlying reasons for such gender differences in moral hazard. I address this question 
by following a similar methodology to the first essay. My experimental design allows 
decomposing the different moral hazard channels through which default occurs in 
microfinance and interact them with gender and types of societies (matrilineal and 
patrilineal). I find that women in matrilineal society are more prone to exhibit moral 
hazard behavior than patrilineal women. Based on my findings, I argue that the gender 
differences in moral hazard is driven by the difference in social context, norms and the 
gender roles between the two societies. 
The final essay examines what drives gender differences in trust and 
trustworthiness, by conducting trust experiments in neighboring matrilineal and 
patrilineal societies in India. I find that on average the matrilineal subjects are more 
trusting as well as more trustworthy than the patrilineal subjects, but there is a significant 
heterogeneity in gender effects. Women in matrilineal society are both less trusting and 
less trustworthy than patrilineal women, compared to their male counterparts. This 
finding holds true even after controlling for risk preference and other individual 
characteristics. My findings  suggest that societal structures are crucially linked to the 
observed gender differences in trust and trustworthiness. 
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Chapter 1  
Are Women Really Better Borrowers in Microfinance?  
Evidence from Matrilineal and Patrilineal Societies in India 
                                                                                                                                                   
1.1 Introduction 
 
In their book Poor economics: A radical rethinking of the way to fight global 
poverty, Banerjee and Dufflo (2011) narrate the story of fruit vendors in India who take 
an average daily loan of 1000 Indian Rupees ($51PPP) in the morning from the local 
moneylenders and repays them 1046.90 Indian Rupees at night. The interest payment is 
an astounding 4.69% per day. It implies that an equivalent of a $5 loan if it goes unrepaid 
for a year, leaves an insurmountable debt of nearly $100 million. The story highlights an 
important point that a major constraint for the poor is the lack of access to formal credit.  
However, this lack of financial access is in no way unique to the fruit vendors of India. 
Even within the highly developed financial markets such as that of the US, 26 million 
consumers are credit-invisible, having no formal credit record (Brevoort et al., 2015). It 
represents about 11% of all adult Americans and 30% of consumers in low-income 
neighborhoods. The picture is gloomier if we consider the entire global economy where 
over 2.5 billion people, that is, more than one-third of the world’s population, use no 
formal ﬁnancial services for either savings or borrowing (Karlan and Appel, 2011). Against 
this background, microﬁnance has emerged as an alternative way to rethink banking for 
the poor.  
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Microﬁnance can be viewed as the provision of credit and other ﬁnancial services 
for the poor who are otherwise denied access to such services by the formal commercial 
banking system. The two lending innovations that have received the maximum attention 
in the field are gender targeting and group liability. This chapter will primarily focus on 
the former one. While traditional banking system has historically preferred male clients, 
women make up the majority of microfinance borrowers (Khandker, 1998).  This seeming 
puzzle can be explained by the double dividend of gender targeting in microfinance. The 
first is the social dividend of achieving women empowerment through microfinance. It 
evolves from the popular notion that microfinance typically enhances women's monetary 
income, control over their income, and their bargaining power within the household 
(D’Espallier et al., 2011). These effects are expected to engender positive spillovers by 
improving family welfare such as child schooling and healthcare, as well as in the 
community at large by increasing women participation in social decision-making process. 
The second is the economic dividend. It is based on the common belief that gender 
targeting generates high repayment rates for the lenders in microfinance as women are 
better credit risks than men. Given this conventional wisdom in the microfinance 
industry, the important question that follows is, what drives this gender differences in 
behavior? The microfinance literature has not yet addressed this question deeply as it 
broadly treats women as a homogeneous group without considering the heterogeneity 
created in them by the social context in which they live and interact. Many advocates of 
gender targeting in microﬁnance argue that women are better borrowers due to their 
intrinsic nature, since by nature women are more compliant and cooperative. On the 
other hand, social anthropologists and sociologists focus on social processes and the 
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weight of social norms in the construction of gender roles. This line of research suggests 
that the diﬀerences between men and women are not primarily due to biological or 
evolutionary reasons, but rather to social context, conditionings, and norms. For example, 
the social role theory of gender differences suggests that most behavioral differences 
between men and women are the result of social and cultural stereotypes about gender, 
that is, behaviors we expect to see from men and women in a particular society (Dulin, 
2007). Thus, according to the social role theory, societal and cultural variations in norms 
and gender roles will have diﬀerent behavioral implications for borrowers across different 
types of societies as opposed to the existence of a universal gender difference. 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the universal policy of gender targeting 
to mitigate microfinance loan default and to study the underlying reasons for what drives 
such gender differences in behavior. Are women wired naturally and fundamentally 
different than men to be better at repaying loans or is it the social context in which the 
gender roles operate that motivate their behavior? To address this question, I design and 
conduct microfinance field experiments in two neighboring societies in India-  the Khasi 
society in the East Khasi Hills district of Meghalaya and the Karbi society right across the 
border in Karbi Anglong district of Assam.  The two societies are only about 100 miles 
apart from each other and are comparable regarding their socio-economic condition, 
geography, shared history, religion, caste, education, primary occupation etcetera. 
Moreover, the two societies share the same genetic background and appear to be close kin 
based on genetic analysis of six polymorphic loci (Roychoudhury, 1992).  However, they 
have historically evolved to be different regarding gender relation-  the Khasi society is a 
matrilineal society while the Karbi society is a patrilineal society. It means that the social 
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norms in general and the economic rules of inheritance and control of property are 
distinctly diﬀerent in the matrilineal Khasi society than in the patrilineal Karbi society. 
The patrilineal Karbi society is a traditional patriarchal society ruled by men. In 
particular, men inherit and control property. Also, after marriage women move to their 
husband’s house, take care of the husband’s family, but have very little bargaining or 
decision making power. In contrast, in the matrilineal Khasi society, men do not inherit 
property, women do. The youngest daughter in the family inherits property, as opposed 
to the eldest son in the patrilineal Karbi society. Also, the Khasis follow a matrilocal 
custom in marriage whereby the husband goes to live with the wife’s family, take care of 
the wife’s family but do not have any property right there. In contrast to the Karbi women, 
in the matrilineal Khasi society, women have substantial bargaining and decision making 
power. Thus running the same microfinance experiment in these two societies allows me 
to compare between a gender effect and the interaction effect of gender and underlying 
social norms on financial behavior, by exploiting the variation in social context and 
gender roles in otherwise comparable matrilineal and patrilineal societies.  
The previous studies that are closest to mine are Gneezy et al. (2009) and Andersen 
et al. (2008). Both the studies have run experiments with the matrilineal Khasis of 
Meghalaya but studying different research questions. Gneezy et al. (2009) look at gender 
and competition while Andersen et al. (2008) examine the contribution to the provision 
of public good. Both the studies found that Khasi women show very different behavioral 
pattern than women elsewhere. These studies have progressed our understanding on the 
importance of social context as a source of gender differences in behavior. I use this key 
insight to study what drives gender difference in behavior among microfinance borrowers 
5 
 
while mitigating possible confounds of the previous studies. Both Gneezy et al. (2009) 
and Andersen et al. (2008) are potentially plagued by a lack of comparable matrilineal 
and patrilineal society. Gneezy et al. (2009) use the patriarchal Maasai society of Tanzania 
to compare the gender difference in competition among the Khasis. However, the two 
societies are in different continents and thus differ substantially regarding culture and 
other factors as suggested by the authors themselves (Gneezy et al., 2009; footnote 4, p. 
1638). Andersen et al. (2008) compare the provision of public good among the Khasis 
with closer comparison groups of two patrilineal villages in the neighboring state of 
Assam. However, there is a potential confound between religion and matrilineality in 
their study, “While the people in the Khasi village we study were mostly Christian, one 
of the patriarchal villages was Hindi (Hindu) while the other was Muslim (Andersen et 
al., 2008; p.377).” To alleviate such potential confound, I identify a patrilineal society 
which is more comparable to the Khasis to achieve a better balance of observables 
between the two societies. My patrilineal sample is the Karbi society in Assam who live 
right across the border from the Khasis. Both Khasis and Karbis are indigenous tribes and 
in both societies about three-fourth are Christians while the rest follow their indigenous 
faith (nature worship), thereby attenuating the confound between religion and 
matrilineality found in the previous experiments. It provides more confidence to draw 
valid inferences from my study.  
My experimental design incorporates two treatments- individual game treatment 
and group liability game treatment. In the individual game, each person receives a loan 
and decides to invest it between a relatively safer project with a lower return and a riskier 
project with a higher return. If the chosen project is successful, the individual decides to 
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repay her loan or to default strategically. In the group liability games, two individuals of 
the same gender are randomly matched and are liable for each other's loans. It means that 
both group members are liable if any one group member defaults, thus providing 
insurance to the lender against individual default risk. Section 2 describes the concept of 
group liability in more details. In the experiment, each group member receives a loan and 
decides independently to invest it between a relatively safer project and a riskier project, 
same as that in the individual game.  However, in the group game, every single group 
member has a higher incentive of choosing a riskier project for higher return due to group 
liability and risk sharing among the group members. It is known in the literature as 
project choice or the ex-ante moral hazard channel. If the project is successful, which is 
private information to the individual group members, they decide independently to 
contribute to the group repayment or default strategically. Again, in the group game, each 
group member has a higher incentive to default strategically and free ride off each other 
due to group liability clause. It is known in the literature as repayment choice or the ex-
post moral hazard channel.  
The most significant finding of my paper is that although women on average 
display lower default, it is not a universal result. There is substantial heterogeneity 
between the matrilineal and patrilineal societies. In fact, I find a reversal of gender effect 
across the two societies.  I find that women in patrilineal Karbi society have a lower default 
than Karbi men while matrilineal Khasi women have a higher default than their male 
counterparts. It holds true even after controlling for demographic characteristics such as 
age, education, profession, household information, religion, caste, trust etcetera. Another 
significant result is that group liability reduces default in my experiment, which can be 
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attributed to the risk sharing among group members. Based on my main findings, I argue 
that the gender difference in behavior is driven by the difference in social context, norms 
and the gender roles between the matrilineal and the patrilineal societies. 
I consider three alternative explanation of my findings and evaluate them with 
data. The first is that the gender difference in behavior between the matrilineal and 
patrilineal societies can be explained by the variation in risk behavior among them. The 
second is that the variation in behavior among subjects is driven by previous experience 
with microfinance and borrowing outside the experiment. The third is that the gender 
difference in results is an artifact of comparing the matrilineal Khasis with the particular 
patrilineal Karbi society in my I study. To evaluate the first explanation, I implement an 
investment risk (IR) task to control for subject specific risk attitude. In the IR task, 
subjects choose which lottery to play out from a set of ordered lotteries that increase 
linearly in both expected payoff and risk. It allows me to explicitly control for the subject’s 
risk attitude while analyzing her behavior in the microfinance games. I find that the 
variations in risk behavior among the subjects explain the heterogeneity in the gender 
difference in the choice of risky project but not in strategic default between the two 
societies. To address the second alternative explanation, I collect self-reported data on 
whether a subject belongs to a microfinance group and if she has taken any previous loans. 
I find no significant effect of past experience with microfinance and borrowing on 
behavior in the experiment. Finally, one can argue that the proximity and shared culture 
and history of the Khasi and Karbi societies might influence the behavior of the subjects 
in a way that is not explicitly captured in the analysis. Thus, if the experiment is run with 
a mainstream patriarchal society, as opposed to a patrilineal indigenous tribe such as the 
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Karbis, we might observe different behavior. To evaluate this explanation, I run the same 
microfinance experiments with Bengali men and women in the neighboring state of West 
Bengal. Unlike the Karbis, the Bengali society is a mainstream patrilineal society and the 
gender relation among them is representative of that of the rest of India as well as most 
of the developing world. All my principal findings regarding sign and significance are 
robust when I compare the matrilineal Khasis with the patrilineal Bengalis. It reinforces 
my conclusion that gender difference in behavior is driven by the social context, norms 
and the gender roles in different societies.  
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. The next section explains the 
concept and role of gender and group liability in microfinance literature. Section 3 
describes the experimental design and presents an overview of the data comprising of the 
matrilineal and patrilineal societies. In Section 4, I report my main empirical results. 
Section 5 discusses the alternative explanations of the results. Section 6 highlights the 
policy implications and concludes. 
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1.2 Gender and Group Liability in Microfinance Literature 
 
The literature often adduces group liability as a critical innovation for the 
expansion of microfinance. The practice pioneered by Yunus through his Grameen Bank 
has been replicated by many MFIs across the world. The theoretical rationale for the 
group liability contracts is risk sharing among the group members. Unless the individual 
risks are perfectly correlated, the overall risk of involuntary default (default due to project 
failure) can be substantially lower under group liability. However, in recent years, many 
MFIs like Association for Social Advancement (ASA) in Bangladesh, the Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI), Banco Sol in Bolivia and even the Grameen Bank in its Grameen II 
program have moved away from group liability loans.  The main argument for this shift is 
that under group liability bad clients can “free ride” off good clients causing default rates 
to rise.  In other words, a client does not repay the loan because she believes that another 
client will pay it for her. Moreover, group liability is costlier for clients that are good risks 
because they are often required to repay the loans of their peers.  It may lead to higher 
dropout and more difficulty in attracting new clients. So theoretically the effect of group 
liability on repayment rate is not unequivocal. Also, there have been few empirical 
research to directly compare situations under group liability contracts with comparable 
situations under individual contracts.  Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) 
observes, “The best evidence would come from well-designed, deliberate experiments in 
which loan contracts are varied but everything else is kept the same.” 
The practice of gender targeting in microﬁnance stems from two primary 
objectives. The first, as mentioned before, is the social dividend of achieving women 
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empowerment and social outcomes through microfinance. However, this popular rhetoric 
has been brought to question by recent evidence from the field. Banerjee et al. (2015) 
report result from the first and the longest running evaluation of microfinance from a 
randomized control trial in the slums of Hyderabad, India. They find no significant effect 
of gender targeting on health, education or women’s empowerment.  After three years of 
providing microcredit to women, they observe no proof of any important changes in 
household decision-making or social outcomes. Other recent studies such as Tarozzi et al. 
(2015), Attanasio et al. (2015) and Crépon et al. (2015) also show similar findings. Tarozzi 
et al. (2015) conduct a randomized field experiment in Ethiopia. They construct indicators 
of women’s empowerment and found no significant improvement of it by providing 
microfinance loan. Their point estimates, in fact, indicate a small but not statistically 
significant decline in the women’s empowerment indicator. They also observe that the 
increase in schooling attendance of children in the treated area where microfinance was 
provided is insignificant whereas the corresponding increase in the untreated area was 
substantial. Attanasio et al. (2015) also do not find any evidence of schooling impact or 
reduction in child labor due to microcredit program targeted towards women in their field 
experiment in Mongolia. Crépon et al. (2015) conduct a randomized control trial in 
Morocco and found no evidence on the effect of microfinance on their women 
empowerment index. Thus, in the wake of the new evidence from the randomized 
evaluations, the effectiveness of the social objective of gender targeting has received at 
least some push back. However, gender targeting can also be justified as an effective tool 
in microfinance for the second objective of economic dividend for the MFIs by 
extenuating moral hazard problem and reducing default among borrowers. Kevane and 
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Wydick (2001) report from a field experiment that female credit groups have better loan 
repayment records than male groups in Guatemala. D'Espallier et al. (2011) observe from 
a global data set that MFIs with more clients being women have significantly higher 
repayment rates. Thus, it may be profit-maximizing for the lenders to target female 
clients, independent of other social concerns about gender.  
Previously Gneezy et al. (2009) conducted a competition game experiment with 
the matrilineal Khasis of Meghalaya and used the patriarchal Maasai society of Tanzania 
in Africa to compare results. Andersen et al. (2008) conducted a public goods provision 
game experiment with the same Khasi population of Meghalaya and chose closer 
comparison groups in two patrilineal villages in the neighboring state of Assam. However, 
the authors provide the following caution of the confound between religion and 
matrilineality in their study, “An important caveat to our findings concerns the potential 
confound between religion and matrilineality across villages…When designing the 
experiments, we did not predict such a strong influence of the religion of the 
participants…Further research is needed to disentangle this potential confound in our 
data (Andersen et al., 2008; p.381).” I carefully identify and conduct experiment with a 
more comparable patrilineal Karbi group to achieve a better balance of observables 
between the two societies, thereby relieving the confound between religion and 
matrilineality found in the previous experiments.  
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1.3 Experimental Design 
1.3.1 Data 
The subject pool consists of adult men and women belonging to matrilineal Khasi 
and patrilineal Karbi societies in two neighboring states of India. The Khasis reside in the 
East Khasi Hills district of Meghalaya while the Karbis live right across the border in Karbi 
Anglong district of Assam.  Both districts were part of the state of Assam until 21 January 
1972. The two districts are only about 100 miles apart from each other and are comparable 
regarding their history, cultural, geography, and basic economic conditions. The main 
difference between them is that the Khasis are a matrilineal society while the Karbis are 
a traditionally patriarchal society. I exclude all villages that are on the border of Assam 
and Meghalaya and sample the villages per the criteria that they are in the interior from 
the border so that the matrilineal and patrilineal practices are strong and there are no 
intermarriages. From a list of 40 such villages, I randomly determine 12 villages. After 
selecting the villages, I meet the village head in each village, along with my local partners. 
According to the local custom, the village head coordinates the recruitment along with us 
but is not told the nature of the experiment. To minimize the possibility of selection bias, 
I apply identical selection procedures in both the societies. Before going to the villages to 
conduct experiment, I randomly determine whether the village will have male session or 
female session. Then I randomly determine which game will be played in each village. I 
follow this same procedure for both matrilineal and patrilineal villages. I invite the entire 
village and only recruit one person per household, either male or female depending on 
the session. When the participants arrive, I give them consent forms. Subjects do not 
know the nature of the experiment till they participate.   
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There are 298 subjects in total - 150 Khasi and 148 Karbi; 150 are female and 148 
are male. The subjects fill out a questionnaire for which they are paid. The questionnaire 
collects information about their individual characteristics. Table 1 summarizes some of 
the most relevant individual information for each society separately. My average subject 
is 31.5 years old, have little over seven years of education and has about six household 
members. Two of my most important individual level characteristics are religion and 
caste. Row 4-6 of Table 1.1 shows that in the Khasi society 66% are Christians while the 
rest follow their indigenous tribal religion. The corresponding figure in the Karbi 
community is 62%. Also, at least 97% of both societies are schedule tribes which refers to 
disadvantaged indigenous people in the Indian caste system. Thus, I have good balance 
on religion and caste across the two societies. About 55% of the males in my sample are 
head of households while only 19% of females are the same. This gap is much smaller 
among the Khasis than among the Karbis. 61% of Khasis and 39% of Karbis live in 
temporary dwellings which are non-permanent constructions (Kutcha house) such as 
mud houses. 78% of the Khasis have a bank account, and 24% of them have taken out at 
least one loan. On the other hand, 62% of Karbis have a bank account, but 29% of them 
have taken out at least one loan. 48% of Khasis and 69% of Karbis belong to a 
microfinance group; the corresponding figures are more for women than men in both the 
societies.  Finally, the subjects write down the first names of their five close friends, and 
then they are asked how many of these five friends do they trust enough to lend money. I 
find that in both societies, women trust more than men. These differences in observable 
characteristics of gender, both intra and intersociety, highlight that it is important to 
control for these factors when analyzing the data. 
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Table 1.1: Summary of individual level characteristics of subjects by gender and society 
    Individual  Overall Khasi Karbi 
   characteristics Pooled Male Female Diff Pooled Male Female Diff. Pooled Male Female Diff. 
             
   Age 31.53 
(10.17) 
31.06 
(10.12) 
32 
(10.23) 
-0.94 31.78 
(11.04) 
30.14 
(9.72) 
33.75 
(12.24) 
-3.61*** 31.28 
(9.23) 
32.20 
(10.56) 
30.55 
(7.8) 
1.65* 
   Education years 7.40 
(4.06) 
7.40 
(3.95) 
7.37 
(4.18) 
0.03 7.62 
(3.94) 
7.52 
(3.87) 
7.74 
(4.03) 
-0.22 7.20 
(4.20) 
7.30 
(4.07) 
7.06 
(4.30) 
0.24 
   Farmer 0.38 
(0.48) 
0.45 
(0.49) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
0.14*** 0.30 
(0.45) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.04 0.47 
(0.50) 
0.62 
(0.49) 
0.34 
(0.48) 
0.28*** 
   Tribal religion 0.36 
(0.48) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
0.41 
(0.59) 
-0.10*** 0.34 
(0.48) 
0.34 
(0.48) 
0.34 
(0.46) 
0 0.38 
(0.48) 
0.27 
(0.45) 
0.46 
(0.50) 
-0.19*** 
   Christian 0.64 
(0.48) 
0.69 
(0.46) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
0.10*** 0.66 
(0.48) 
0.66 
(0.48) 
0.66 
(0.46) 
0 0.62 
(0.48) 
0.73 
(0.45) 
0.54 
(0.50) 
0.19*** 
   Schedule tribe 0.98 
(0.15) 
0.97 
(0.18) 
0.99 
(0.11) 
-0.02** 0.98 
(0.14) 
0.99 
(0.12) 
0.97 
(0.17) 
0.02 0.97 
(0.16) 
0.94 
(0.24) 
1 
(0) 
-0.06*** 
   Ever married 0.71 
(0.45) 
0.58 
(0.49) 
0.83 
(0.37) 
-0.25*** 0.64 
(0.48) 
0.49 
(0.5) 
0.82 
(0.38) 
-0.33*** 0.78 
(0.41) 
0.70 
(0.46) 
0.84 
(0.37) 
-0.14*** 
   I am household head 0.37 
(0.48) 
0.55 
(0.5) 
0.19 
(0.39) 
0.36*** 0.37 
(0.49) 
0.48 
(0.5) 
0.25 
(0.44) 
0.23*** 0.36 
(0.48) 
0.64 
(0.48) 
0.15 
(0.35) 
0.49*** 
   Household members 
 
6.12 
(2.38) 
6.21 
(2.19) 
6.03 
(2.55) 
0.18 6.07 
(2.47) 
6.28 
(2.47) 
5.82 
(2.46) 
0.46** 6.18 
(2.29) 
6.13 
(1.82) 
6.20 
(2.61) 
-0.07 
   Lives in temporary    
dwellings 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.47 
(0.49) 
0.53 
(0.50) 
-0.06 0.61 
(0.49) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
0.62 
(0.49) 
-0.03 0.39 
(0.5) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.45 
(0.5) 
-0.13*** 
  Holds a bank account 0.70 
(0.46) 
0.67 
(0.46) 
0.73 
(0.44) 
-0.06 0.78 
(0.42) 
0.74 
(0.44) 
0.82 
(0.38) 
-0.08** 0.62 
(0.48) 
0.58 
(0.49) 
0.66 
(0.47) 
-0.08* 
Microfinance member  0.59 
(0.50) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
0.77 
(0.42) 
-0.36*** 0.48 
(0.50) 
0.34 
(0.48) 
0.65 
(0.48) 
-0.31** 0.69 
(0.47) 
0.48 
(0.50) 
0.82 
(0.38) 
-0.38*** 
  Borrower 0.27 
(0.44) 
 
0.17 
(0.38) 
 
0.36 
(0.48) 
 
-0.19*** 0.24 
(0.43) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
 
0.42 
(0.50) 
 
-0.32*** 0.29 
(0.46) 
 
0.26 
(0.44) 
 
0.32 
(0.47) 
 
-0.06 
  No. of friends I trust 2.59 
(1.95) 
2.43 
(1.98) 
2.74 
(1.90) 
-0.31** 1.93 
(1.71) 
1.80 
(1.71) 
2.07 
(1.70) 
-0.27* 3.26 
(1.94) 
3.21 
(2.02) 
3.29 
(1.87) 
-0.08 
N 298 148 150  150 82 68  148 66 82  
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1.3.2 Experimental Framework 
The design framework for the microfinance loan contract consists of the individual 
setting and the group setting.  In the individual setting, each individual is provided with 
a loan of L (where L ≥ 0). The interest rate charged on loan is r (such that 0 < r <1). Each 
decides to invest the loan amount L in project X or project Y. Project X leads to a return 
of S (such that S > (1+r) L) in the case of success with a probability of Ps and zero in the 
event of failure with a probability of (1-Ps). Project Y leads to a return of R (s.t R > S > 
(1+r) L) in the case of success with a probability of PR and zero in the event of failure with 
a probability of (1- PR). If the project is successful, the individual has a choice to repay 
(1+r)L or to default strategically. If the subject decides to repay, the game moves to the 
next round; otherwise, the game ends for that subject. Earnings from no previous rounds 
can be used to repay in the current round.   
In the group setting, a loan of 2L is provided to a group comprising of two 
members. Under the group liability contract, both group members are jointly liable for 
the repayment of the loan. Each member of the group receives a loan of L. The interest 
rate charged on loan is r (such that 0 < r <1). Each group member decides to invest the 
loan amount L in project X or project Y. Project X leads to a return of S (such that S > 
(1+r)2L) in the case of success with a probability of Ps and zero in the case of failure with 
a probability of (1-Ps). Project Y leads to a return of R (such that R > S > (1+r)2L) in the 
case of success with a probability of PR and zero in the case of failure with a probability of 
(1- PR). To model joint liability in a simple and straightforward way, the debt of (1+r)2L 
is shared evenly among the group members who are able and willing to contribute. So, if 
both members repay, each will pay (1+r)L, which is the same as in the individual setting. 
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Since contributions can only be financed from the current round's project payoffs, full 
repayment is only possible if at least one of the group members contribute. Only if the 
group fulfills its repayment obligation, does the game continue into a further round, 
which proceeds in the same way with the same group. 
 
1.3.3 Microfinance Games 
I implement two microfinance games- one individual game (IG) and one group 
game (GG). Each subject participates in only one of the two games. In each round of the 
IG, each subject receives a loan of Indian Rupees (Rs) 20 and decides to invest it in a 
relatively safer project X or a riskier project Y.  If project X succeeds, the investor receives 
a payoff of Rs 60 while if project Y succeed she receive Rs 160. If either project fails, the 
investor receives zero. The probability of success of project X is 5/6 while that of project 
Y is 1/2. A simple lottery of drawing colored or white balls from a bucket is used to 
determine the status (success or failure) of the project. If a project is successful, the 
subject has a choice to repay her loan with 25% interest or to default strategically. If the 
subject decided to repay Rs 25, the game moves to the next round; otherwise, the game 
ends for the subject. Earnings from no previous rounds can be used to repay the loan in 
the current round.  So, if an individual’s project fails, she cannot make the loan 
repayment, and the game ends. It is consistent with the dynamic incentive structure 
imposed by previous experiments and practiced by MFIs.  
A simple lottery is used to determine the status (success or failure) of the project. 
Each subject is presented with two buckets-bucket X and bucket Y, each containing six 
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balls. Bucket X contains five colored balls and one white ball while bucket Y contains three 
colored and three white balls. All the balls are identical in size, shape, and weight. Each 
subject chooses a bucket in private draws a ball from the chosen bucket without looking 
inside it. If she draws a colored ball, it indicates that her project is successful and she 
receives Rs 60 (if bucket X is chosen) or Rs 160 (if bucket Y is chosen). However, if she 
draws a white ball from either of the buckets, it indicates that her project is not successful 
and she receives zero. Which bucket an individual subject chooses and what colored ball 
she draws is private information to her. This method of using a visual representation of 
probability using different distributions of white and colored balls is chosen due to its 
relative simplicity in communicating the concept of probability to a semi-literate subject.  
In GG, groups are formed by randomly pairing two individual subjects of the same 
gender. The groups remain the same throughout the experiment, but the subjects are 
never revealed the identities of the other group members. A group loan of Rs 40 is 
provided for the repayment of which both group members are jointly liable. Each group 
member receives a loan of Rs 20 and decides to invest it in project X or Y which are same 
as in IG.  Whether the project succeeds or fails is private information to the individual. If 
a project is successful, group members have a choice to contribute to the group repayment 
or default strategically. The group is liable to repay a total amount of Rs 50. To model 
joint liability in a simple and straightforward way, the group debt of Rs 50 is split equally 
among the group members who are able and willing to contribute. Thus, if both group 
members are willing and able to contribute then each has to contribute Rs 25 to the group 
repayment which is same as in IG. However, if one member defaults, the other group 
member must repay the entire group loan of Rs 50. Since contributions can only be 
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financed from the current round’s project payoffs, full repayment is only possible if at 
least one of the group members contribute. If the group as a whole fail to repay then, no 
further rounds are played, and the group members obtain no further payoffs. After each 
round, players are informed about their project payoff, their round payoff (comprised of 
one’s project payoff minus the players’ share of the repayment burden) and whether their 
partner contributed in the respective round. However, they are not provided with any 
information about which project their partner chose, whether the project was successful 
and if success, whether the partner opted to default strategically. Thus, if their partner 
does not contribute, the subjects cannot distinguish between whether it is due to non-
strategic default (project failure) or strategic default. The design of GG incorporates the 
possibility of both ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard for the subjects. 
Each subject participates in the experiment for three rounds. However, they are 
not told about the number of rounds in advance to reduce end round effect.  Also, all 
groups in a session complete the procedure three times, even if their play stops because 
of default.  It ensures that the constitution of the groups are not revealed by the diverging 
duration of the game (this will otherwise distort both anonymity and the statistical 
independence of the groups). Moreover, it also ensures that a preference for a short 
playing time cannot counteract the pecuniary incentives. After the session, the subjects 
are paid in private for all rounds in the game. The wordings of the instructions are neutral 
to avoid any unobservable eﬀects of possible connotations and so that the subjects do not 
make decisions based on their past knowledge or behavior outside the experiment. The 
idea is that by making the subjects undertake decisions like those they will be taking in 
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actual microﬁnance transaction, but without the particular microﬁnance context, I will 
observe their behavior while minimizing outside inﬂuence in the experiment. 
 
 
 
1.4    Results 
1.4.1  Descriptive Analysis 
I start by looking at the gender difference in the pooled sample and then separately 
for each society. Column 1 of Table 1.2 shows the difference in means. Column 2 shows 
the p-values using simple two-sample t-tests. However, I have multiple outcomes, 
treatments, and subgroups on which I want to conduct hypothesis testing, but the simple 
t-test does not account for it. Thus, column 3 reports multiplicity-adjusted p-values 
computed using Theorem 3.1 of List et al. (2016). Column 4 and five report p-values from 
the non-parametric Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests to look at the 
difference between the underlying distributions of the samples. Figure 1.1 shows the 
gender difference in loan default in the pooled sample. Although in the pooled sample 
women have lower default rate than men, it is not statistically significant in the simple or 
multiplicity adjusted mean test, Mann-Whitney test or K-S test. Then I partition the 
sample based on the societies as depicted in Figure 1.2. I find that women in patrilineal 
Karbi society have lower default rate than Karbi men while matrilineal Khasi women have 
higher default rate than their male counterparts.  
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Figure 1.1: Mean Loan Default Rates: Pooled Male vs. Female 
                               
Figure 1.2: Mean Loan Default Rates: Matrilineal Khasi vs. Patrilineal Karbi 
11%
9%
Pooled Male Pooled Female
Mean Default Rates
19%
7%
5%
12%
Patrilineal Karbi Matrilineal Khasi
Mean Default Rates
Male Female
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I find that in the pooled sample, men choose to invest in the risky project 
significantly more than women but find no significant gender difference in strategic 
default. Breaking the sample by societies, I find that the matrilineal Khasi men have 
significantly higher risky project choice rate while Khasi women have a significantly 
higher strategic default rate. The non-parametric Mann-Whitney and K-S test also ratify 
this results. In contrast to the Khasi findings, in the Karbi society, men have both higher 
risky project choice rate and strategic default rate which are significant at least at p < 0.05 
level. Figure 1.3 shows that the gender gap is lower among Khasis than among Karbis, 
although in both societies men have higher risky project choice rate. Figure 1.4 depicts 
reversal of gender difference among Khasis and Karbis for strategic default. In Khasi 
society, women default more strategically while in Karbi society, men have a higher 
strategic default rate. A more striking finding is that the Khasi women not only default 
more strategically than Khasi men but also more than Karbi men. 
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Figure 1.3: Mean Risky Project Rates: Matrilineal Khasi vs. Patrilineal Karbi 
 
Figure 1.4: Mean Strategic Default Rates: Matrilineal Khasi vs. Patrilineal Karbi 
64%
28%
64%
50%
Patrilineal Karbi Matrilineal Khasi
Risky Project Choice
Male Female
7%
1%
3%
11%
Patrilineal Karbi Matrilineal Khasi
Strategic Default Rates
Male Female
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Table 1.2: Parametric and non-parametric test for outcome variables for Khasi and Karbi 
sample 
  p-values 
Outcome Variables Difference 
in Means 
Simple 
Means test 
Multiplicity 
Adj. 
Mann-
Whitney  
K-S  
test  
Loan Default      
Pooled male vs. female 0.02 0.41 0.66 0.41 1 
Pooled Khasi vs. Karbi -0.4 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.91 
Khasi male vs. female -0.07 0.01** 0.04** 0.01** 0.77 
Karbi male vs. female 0.12 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.13 
      
Risky Project Choice      
Pooled male vs. female 0.26 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Pooled Khasi vs. Karbi 0.15 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Khasi male vs. female 0.14 0.00*** 0.01** 0.00*** 0.03** 
Karbi male vs. female 0.36 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
      
Strategic Default      
Pooled male vs. female -0.01 0.57 0.56 0.57 1 
Pooled Khasi vs. Karbi 0.03 0.03** 0.03** 0.04** 0.99 
Khasi male vs. female -0.08 0.00*** 0.02** 0.00*** 0.62 
Karbi male vs. female 0.06 0.00*** 0.03** 0.00*** 0.94 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
1.4.2 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Although the descriptive analysis provides prima facie evidence of the difference 
in behavior of subjects across gender and society, there has been no attempt in these 
unconditional tests to control for observables. To address that, I analyze the data in a 
regression framework. My first outcome variable is loan default which is a binary variable 
(1= loan goes unrepaid for group j in round t; 0=loan is repaid by group j in round t). 
Table 1.3 shows result using the above model for both the individual and group game. For 
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the analysis, individual liability loans are considered group loans with group size n=1. The 
standard errors are then clustered at the group level. Due to the dichotomous nature of 
my outcome variable, I consider both linear and non-linear regression framework. 
Column 1-3 of Table 1.3 shows results for linear regression while column 4-6 report 
marginal coefficients using Probit model. Table 1.3 shows three broad results. When 
considering the pooled data from both Khasi and Karbi sample, the coefficient estimates 
on female suggest that women are about 14 percent less likely to default than men on 
average and it is significant at p < 0.05 level. However, row 3 of Table 1.3 shows that Khasi 
women are 18 percent more likely to default than Karbi women, compared to their male 
counterparts and it is highly significant at p < 0.01 level. I find that, for both LPM and 
Probit model, the Khasis are 14 percent less likely to default, which is significant at p < 
0.01 level. However, as noted before, Khasi women are significantly more likely to default 
than Karbi women. These two results together imply that the Khasi men are less likely to 
default than Karbi men. I also find that group liability reduces the probability of loan 
default in a round by about 12-14 percent and it is significant at p < 0.05 level. It can be 
attributed to the risk sharing among group members that reduce the likelihood of 
involuntary or non-strategic default in group liability loans, as found in Abbink et al. 
(2006). Thus, from a lender’s perspective, group liability contracts are more profitable on 
average. However, when I interact group liability with female, with Khasis, and both, 
there is no significant effect. These findings together lead to my first set of formal result: 
RESULT 1.1: Gender targeting reduce loan default on average, but there is significant 
heterogeneity across societies. 
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RESULT 1.2: Women in matrilineal society have higher loan default than patrilineal 
women, compared to their male counterparts.  
RESULT 1.3: Group liability improve the microfinance lender’s bottom line. 
Table 1.3: Regression results for outcome variable loan default (1= loan goes unrepaid, 
0=loan is repaid) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Loan default LPM LPM LPM Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
       
Female    -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.18**    -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.14*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Matrilineal Khasi    -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14***    -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Group liability __ -0.11*** -0.14** __ -0.10*** -0.12*** 
  (0.03) (0.05)  (0.03) (0.04) 
Group liability*Female  __ __ 0.05 __ __ 0.02 
   (0.06)   (0.06) 
Group liability* Female* 
Matrilineal 
__ __ -0.01 
(0.07) 
__ __ 0.02  
(0.07) 
Round fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 825 825 825 825 825 825 
R-squared 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.11 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
I now analyze the channels through which default can occur by considering project 
choice and repayment choice separately. In my empirical model, I control individual level 
demographic characteristics that have been shown to be important in previous studies 
such as age, years of education, profession, religion, caste, household information, 
whether the subject is head of the family, whether the subject lives in a permanent or 
temporary dwelling and holds a bank account.  First I look at risky project choice as the 
outcome variable. It is a binary outcome that takes the value of 1 when the risky project Y 
 26 
 
is chosen by individual member i of group j in round t and 0 when the safer project X is 
chosen by individual member i of group j in round t. I begin with a parsimonious 
specification where I regress the outcomes only on a dummy variable for gender (one if 
the subject is female, zero otherwise), a dummy variable for society (one if the subject is 
Khasi, zero otherwise) and the interaction term. I include round fixed effects. The 
standard errors are robust and clustered at the group level. In the second column, I add a 
dummy variable for group game (one if the behavior is observed in the group game 
treatment, zero otherwise) and the interaction terms with it. In the third column, the 
individual level demographic controls are added. The fourth to sixth column shows the 
marginal coefficients from Probit estimations. The second row of Table 1.4 indicates that 
there is no significant difference between the two societies for risky project choice. I find 
that women on average are significantly less likely to choose the risky project by at least 
30 percent. Row 3 of Table 1.4 suggests that Khasi women are at least 21 percent more 
likely to invest in risky project choice than Karbi women, compared to their male 
counterparts, even after controlling for observable characteristics. However, the 
coefficient estimate is significant in the Probit model but not in the linear model. Another 
important result is that subjects under the group liability contracts are at least 18 percent 
more likely to invest in the risky project than those with individual liability contracts, thus 
showing evidence of ex-ante moral hazard. This finding is significant at p < 0.01 level even 
after controlling for individual characteristics. I can now formulate my next set of results. 
RESULT 2.1: Women are less likely to invest in the risky project on average, but there 
is heterogeneity across societies. 
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RESULT 2.2: Individuals who are less risk averse are significantly more likely to invest 
in the risky project in the microfinance games.  
RESULT 2.3: Group liability leads to ex-ante moral hazard among borrowers.  
 
Table 1.4: Regression results for outcome variable risky project choice (1= risky project is 
chosen, 0=otherwise) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risky project choice LPM LPM LPM Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
       
Female -0.37*** -0.29*** -0.30** -0.36*** -0.30** -0.32** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.004 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.23*** 0.15 0.18 0.22*** 0.17 0.21* 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) 
Group liability __ 0.22*** 0.19*** __ 0.21*** 0.18*** 
  (0.08) (0.09)  (0.07) (0.08) 
Group*Female __ -0.06 -0.02 __ -0.03 0.02 
  (0.1) (0.13)  (0.11) (0.13) 
Group*Female* 
Matrilineal 
__ 0.09 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
__ 0.05 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Round fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 827 827 827 827 824 824 
R-squared 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.11 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Next, I analyze strategic default as the outcome variable. It is also a binary 
outcome that takes the value of 1 when an individual member i of group j default 
strategically in round t and 0 otherwise. The coefficient estimates from Table 1.5 show 
that women are about 4-5 percent less likely to default strategically on average after 
controlling for observable characteristics, but it is only significant if we consider the 
Probit model specification. There is evidence of heterogeneity among women between 
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matrilineal and patrilineal societies. The model specification again becomes relevant 
here. The coefficient estimates from the LPM show that Khasi women are 7 percent more 
likely to strategically default than Karbi women, compared to their male counterparts, 
which is moderately significant at p < 0.1 level.  On the other hand, the coefficient 
estimates from the Probit model shows that after controlling for individual 
characteristics, Khasi women are 39 percent more likely to default strategically than Karbi 
women and it is highly significant at p < 0.01 level. Whichever model one considers, this 
finding qualitatively corroborates the findings from Figure 1.4 of my descriptive analysis. 
In fact, Figure 1.4 depicts that Khasi women default strategically more than not only Karbi 
women but even more than Karbi men. I also find that subjects under the group liability 
contracts are significantly more likely to strategically default than those with individual 
liability contracts, thus showing evidence of ex-post moral hazard. This finding is 
significant at p < 0.01 level even after controlling for individual characteristics and risk 
attitudes. Again, the model specification becomes important here. Subjects are 35 percent 
more likely to strategically default per the Probit model. I formalize my next set of result 
from the above finding. 
RESULT 3.1: Women in matrilineal society default strategically more than women in 
patrilineal society, compared to their male counterparts.  
RESULT 3.2: Group liability leads to ex-post moral hazard among borrowers. 
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Table 1.5: Regression results for outcome variable strategic default (1= default 
strategically, 0=otherwise)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Strategic default LPM LPM LPM Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
       
Female -0.06** -0.02 -0.04 -0.10** -0.01* -0.05** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.04 -0.04 -0.06* -0.04 -0.04 -0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.14*** 0.06* 0.07* 0.16*** 0.36*** 0.39*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) 
Group liability __ 0.05*** 0.05** __ 0.36*** 0.35*** 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.07) (0.07) 
Group*Female __ -0.04** -0.03 __ -0.07* -0.05 
  (0.02) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) 
Group*Female * 
Matrilineal 
__ 0.11** 
(0.05) 
0.11** 
(0.04) 
__ -0.21*** 
(0.06) 
-0.21*** 
(0.07) 
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Round fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 652 652 652 652 618 618 
R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.23 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
1.5 Discussion on Alternative Explanations 
The main finding from Section 4 highlights the reversal of gender effect across the 
matrilineal and patrilineal societies. Although women have a lower default on average, I 
find significant heterogeneity across the two societies. Based on the findings, I argue that 
the gender difference in behavior is driven by the difference in social context, norms and 
the gender roles between the matrilineal and the patrilineal societies. In this section, I 
will explore three alternative explanations. The first explanation is that the results are 
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driven by the difference in risk behavior between the subjects. The second explanation is 
that the results are driven by the subject’s exposure to microfinance and experience with 
borrowing outside the experiment. The final explanation is that the results are an artifact 
of the particular choice of the patrilineal sample in my experiment and may not hold for 
a more mainstream patriarchal society. I will discuss these alternative explanations in 
order.  
 
1.5.1 Are the results driven by variations in risk behavior among the subjects? 
One may allege that the variations in behavior in the microfinance games can be 
explained by the variation in risk behavior among the subjects. Are the less risk-averse 
subjects significantly more likely to choose risky projects and default strategically in the 
experiment? Can the gender differences in behavior between the matrilineal and 
patrilineal societies be explained by a difference in their respective risk preferences? To 
answer these questions, I implement a simple investment risk (IR) task. All subjects in 
the experiment earn an endowment of Rs. 50 for filling up a questionnaire. In the IR task, 
the subjects choose what portion of their earned endowment to invest in a risky lottery. 
The lottery returns three times the amount invested with a 50 percent chance and nothing 
otherwise. They keep the amount not invested in the lottery. It is equivalent to choosing 
which lottery to play out from a set of ordered lotteries presented to the subject that 
increases linearly in expected payoff and standard deviation. The standard deviation 
associated with each lottery measures the risk of that lottery. Given this parameter, a risk 
neutral (or risk-seeking) subject should invest the entire endowment. I show the CRRA 
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range of the subjects based on the following CRRA specification: 𝑈(𝑥)  =  
𝑥1−𝑟
1−𝑟
  ,    when r ≠ 
1 and log (x) when r = 1; where r is the relative risk aversion parameter.     
Table 1.6: Investment risk lotteries with CRRA calculations 
Lottery 
number 
Proportion of earned 
endowment invested 
High 
payoff  
Low 
payoff  
Expected 
value 
Standard 
deviation  
CRRA Range 
       
1 0 
 
50 50 50 
 
0 2.49 < r 
2 0.2 70 40 55 15 0.84 < r < 2.49 
       
3 0.4 90 30 60 30 0.5 < r < 0.84 
       
4 0.6 110 20 65 45 0.33 < r < 0.5 
       
5 0.8 130 10 70 60 0.18 < r < 0.33 
       
6 1 150 0 75 75 r < 0.18 
       
I first look at the gender difference in risk behavior across the two societies.  Figure 
1.5 shows the proportion of earned endowment invested in the risky lottery. I find that in 
the patrilineal society, men invest 74% while women invest only 40% in the risky lottery 
whereas in the matrilineal society there is almost no gender difference in investment. 
Table 1.7 analyzes the proportion of earned endowment invested in a risky lottery, which 
is taken as a proxy for risk preference. I find that women on average invest about 30 
percent less of their earned endowment in a risky lottery, which is significant at p < 0.01 
level. I do find that on average matrilineal Khasis are more risk averse than patrilineal 
Karbis. It is in line with the earlier finding that Khasis on average invest in risky project 
less than Karbis in the microfinance games. In the full model (S2), I control for individual 
characteristics and earnings from the microfinance game. Since the investment risk task 
takes place after the three microfinance rounds in all my experimental sessions, the 
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earnings from the microfinance game rounds may influence the amount invested in the 
lottery. Thus, I control for the microfinance round earnings in my regression model. I find 
that although statistically significant, the coefficient estimate of the microfinance round 
earnings is 0.001 which can be considered negligible and therefore economically 
insignificant. My most important finding from Table 1.7 is that even after controlling for 
microfinance round earnings and other observable characteristics, Khasi women invest 
at least 31 percent more of their earned endowment into the lottery than Karbi women. It 
leads to my next set of results. 
RESULT 4.1: Women are more risk averse on average, but there is significant 
heterogeneity across societies. 
RESULT 4.2: Women in matrilineal society are less risk averse than women in 
patrilineal society, compared to their male counterparts.  
 
Figure 1.5: Risk behavior: Khasi vs. Karbi  
74%
40%
68%
66%
Patrilineal Karbi Matrilineal Khasi
Investment in Risky Lottery
Male Female
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Table 1.7: Linear regression results for investment risk for Khasi and Karbi sample 
Investment risk behavior  (S1) (S2) 
   
Female -0.34*** -0.29*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.06 -0.12** 
 (0.05) (0.06) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.31*** 0.32*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Individual controls No  Yes 
Observations 298 298 
R-squared 0.15 0.25 
Robust standard errors, clustered at individual level, in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
I now analyze if this gender difference in risk behavior drives the gender difference 
in moral hazard behavior. First, I focus on ex-ante moral hazard. Table 1.8 shows the 
results from a Probit estimation model. I find that investment risk behavior is a significant 
predictor of choice of risky project in the microfinance games. The coefficient estimates 
show that the subjects who invest 20% more of their endowment in the risky lottery are 
about 30% more likely to choose the risky project in the microfinance game. This finding 
is significant at p<0.01 level, even after controlling for other individual characteristics. 
Thus, the subjects who are less risk averse are more likely to exhibit ex-ante moral hazard 
behavior. This difference in risk behavior does not completely explain the overall gender 
difference in choice of risky project. When we do not control for risk behavior, women are 
35% less likely to choose the risky project in the pooled sample. After controlling for risk 
behavior, the coefficient drops to 25% and further to 21% after controlling for other 
observable characteristics. However, it is still significant at p<0.05 level. Let’s now focus 
on the heterogeneity analysis. Column 1 of Table 1.8 shows that the matrilineal women 
are 22% more likely to choose the risky project than the patrilineal women, compared to 
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their male counterparts, and it is significant at p<0.05 level. Once I control for investment 
risk behavior, the coefficient estimate drops to 13% and further to 11% after controlling 
for other observable characteristics. More importantly, the coefficient is no longer 
significant. This result can be compared with Table 1.4 which showed that the 
corresponding coefficient after controlling for observables other than risk preference is 
21% and is significant at p<0.1 level. Comparing these two coefficients brings out the 
importance of controlling for risk. Figure 1.5 delineates that the matrilineal women invest 
in the risky lottery almost 1.5 times as much as the patrilineal women. This substantial 
difference in their risk behavior seems to explain the variations in their choice of risky 
project. Table 1.9 shows the results for strategic default. Unlike before, I find that 
investment risk behavior is not a significant predictor of strategic default in the 
microfinance games. The difference in risk behavior neither explains the overall gender 
difference nor the heterogeneity across societies. Even after controlling for risk behavior 
and other individual characteristics, matrilineal women are 38% more likely to default 
strategically than patrilineal women, compared to their male counterparts. This 
coefficient is almost the same as the one obtained from Table 1.5 (where the 
corresponding coefficient is 39%). Moreover, this result remains significant at p<0.01 
level. These findings lead to my next set of results.  
RESULT 4.3: Subjects who are less risk averse are more likely to choose the risky 
project but not more likely to default strategically in the microfinance games. 
RESULT 4.4: Variations in risk behavior significantly explain the heterogeneity in the 
gender difference in the choice of risky project, but not strategic default between the two 
societies.  
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Table 1.8: Probit estimation results for the effect of risk behavior on risky project choice 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risky project choice Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
     
Female -0.35*** -0.25*** -0.24** -0.21** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.22** 0.13 0.11 0.11 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) 
Investment risk behavior __ 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Group liability __ __ 0.19*** 0.19** 
   (0.07) (0.07) 
Group*Female __ __ 0.02 0.011 
   (0.11) (0.12) 
Group*Female*Matrilineal __ __ -0.001 0.012 
   (0.12) (0.12) 
Individual level controls No No No Yes 
Round fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 827 827 827 827 
R-squared 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.14 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 1.9: Probit estimation results for the effect of risk behavior on strategic default 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strategic default Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
     
Female -0.10** -0.09** -0.01 -0.04** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
Investment risk behavior __ 0.003 0.001 0.004 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Group liability __ __ 0.36*** 0.36*** 
   (0.06) (0.05) 
Group*Female __ __ -0.07* -0.06 
   (0.04) (0.04) 
 36 
 
Group*Female*Matrilineal __ __ -0.21*** -0.21*** 
   (0.06) (0.06) 
Individual level controls No No No Yes 
Round fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 652 652 652 634 
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.22 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
1.5.2 Are the results driven by previous experience with microfinance and 
borrowing by the subjects? 
One can reasonably argue that the variations in behavior in the experiment are 
driven by the subjects’ experience with microfinance and borrowing outside the 
experiment. Those who are actual microfinance clients behave systematically different 
than those who have no previous experience with microfinance or borrowing. I attempt 
to mitigate the influence of prior exposure to microfinance on behavior in the experiment 
through the design of my instructions. I use a neutral presentation without giving a 
microﬁnance context when explaining the games. I will now analyze the data to evaluate 
if the variations in the behavior of the subjects can be explained by their exposure to 
microfinance and experience with borrowing outside the experiment. As indicated in 
Table 1.1, 59% of my subjects belong to microfinance groups where the corresponding 
figure is much more for women (77%) than men (41%); and for patrilineal Karbis (69%) 
than matrilineal Khasis (48%). Figure 1.6 shows that in both societies there are at least 
30% more women microfinance group members than men. This is not surprising as 
women constitute more than 80% of all microfinance clients worldwide (D’Espallier et 
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al., 2011). Figure 1.7 shows the variation in borrowers among the subjects. A borrower is 
defined as a subject who has taken at least one loan outside the experiment. Table 1.1 
reports that in the pooled sample, 27% of my subjects are previous borrowers. Again, in 
both societies, there are more women borrowers than men. However, this gender gap is 
much more prominent in the matrilineal society.  
 
 
Figure 1.6: Microfinance Group Member: Khasi vs. Karbi 
48%
87%
34%
65%
Patrilineal Karbi Matrilineal Khasi
Microfinance Group Member
Male Female
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Figure 1.7: Previous Borrower: Khasi vs. Karbi 
I will now examine whether these variations in exposure to microfinance and 
experience with borrowing among the subjects explain their behavior in the experiment. 
Table 1.10 shows the subject’s behavior of risky project choice. I find that whether a 
subject is a microfinance group member or a borrower has no significant impact on her 
choice of risky project in the experiment. In other words, those who have previous 
experience with microfinance do not behave significantly different than those with no 
experience. Controlling for past experience, I find that women on average are significantly 
less likely to choose the risky project by 34 percent. However, women who are members 
of a microfinance group are 16% more likely to choose the risky project than those women 
who do not belong to a microfinance group. Also, I find that those who are less risk averse 
are about 32 percent more likely to choose the risky project in the microfinance game and 
26%
32%
10%
41%
Patrilineal Karbi Matrilineal Khasi
Borrower
Male Female
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it is highly significant. Another important result is that subjects under the group liability 
contracts are 21 percent more likely to invest in the risky project than those with 
individual liability contracts, thus showing evidence of ex-ante moral hazard. Thus, I find 
that the coefficients are very similar not just regarding sign and significance but even 
magnitude to the finding in Table 1.5. Table 1.11 shows the subject’s behavior of strategic 
default. Here also I find that whether a subject is a microfinance group member or a 
borrower has no significant effect overall. However, when I interact them with gender, I 
find that women who belong to a microfinance group are at least 7% less likely to default 
strategically than women who do not belong to a microfinance group. I also find that 
women who have taken at least one loan previously are 9% more likely to default 
strategically than those women who have never taken a loan. There is evidence of 
heterogeneity among women between matrilineal and patrilineal societies. The 
coefficient estimates show that controlling for past experience, risk behavior and other 
observables, matrilineal Khasi women are 16 percent more likely to strategically default 
than patrilineal Karbi women, compared to their male counterparts, which is significant 
at p < 0.01 level.  Moreover, like before, I also find here that subjects under the group 
liability contracts are significantly more likely to strategically default than those with 
individual liability contracts, thus showing evidence of ex-post moral hazard. Thus, all my 
major results remain unchanged after I control for previous borrowing, whether the 
subject belongs to a microfinance group and is an experienced microfinance client. It 
leads me to the next result.  
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RESULT 5.1: The subjects’ exposure to microfinance and experience with borrowing 
outside the experiment do not have any significant impact on their behavior in the 
experiment. 
RESULT 5.2: The heterogeneity in the gender difference in behavior between the two 
societies cannot be explained by the subjects’ exposure to microfinance and experience 
with borrowing outside the experiment. 
Table 1.10: Probit estimation results for the effect of experience with microfinance on 
risky project choice 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risky project choice Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
     
Female -0.35*** -0.36*** -0.42*** -0.34*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.22** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.17** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Microfinance group member __ 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
  (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) 
Borrower __ -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 
  (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) 
Female* member __ __ 0.08 0.16* 
   (0.10) (0.09) 
Female* borrower __ __ 0.03 0.07 
   (0.11) (0.11) 
Investment risk behavior __ __ __ 0.32*** 
    (0.06) 
Group game __ __ __ 0.21*** 
    (0.05) 
Individual level controls No No No Yes 
Round fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 827 827 827 827 
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.15 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.11: Probit estimation results for the effect of experience with microfinance on ex-
post moral hazard 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strategic default Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
     
Female -0.10** -0.09** -0.06 -0.07* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.04 -0.04* -0.04* -0.07** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Microfinance group member __ -0.02 0.02 -0.02 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Borrower __ -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Female* member __ __ -0.09** -0.07* 
   (0.04) (0.04) 
Female* borrower __ __ 0.08 0.09* 
   (0.05) (0.05) 
Investment risk behavior __ __ __ 0.001 
    (0.02) 
Group game __ __ __ 0.09** 
    (0.04) 
Individual level controls No No No Yes 
Round fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 652 652 652 634 
R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.26 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
1.5.3 Are the results an artifact of my particular choice of the patrilineal  
sample? 
Although I have controlled for a host of observable characteristics to compare 
across the matrilineal and patrilineal societies in my empirical model, one might argue 
that the proximity and shared culture and history of the Khasi and Karbi societies might 
influence the behavior of the subjects in a way that is not explicitly captured in my 
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empirical analysis. Thus, the reversal of gender effect across societies is only an artifact of 
comparing the Khasis with the Karbis and cannot be generalized to other more 
mainstream patriarchal societies. To address this alternative explanation, I conduct the 
same experiments with Bengali men and women in the Dooars region in the neighboring 
state of West Bengal, about 300 miles away from the East Khasi Hills. The Khasis of 
Meghalaya and the Bengalis of West Bengal were never part of the same state. Moreover, 
the Bengalis are not an indigenous tribe like the Karbis. The Bengali society is a 
mainstream society and the gender relation among them is representative of that of the 
rest of India as well as most of the developing world. Table 1.12 shows that group liability 
reduces default by 9 percent.  The Khasis overall have a 13 percent lower loan default, 
which is significant at p < 0.01 level. Women overall are 14 percent less likely to default, 
and it is significant at p < 0.01 level. However, Khasi women have a 19 percent higher 
default than Bengali women, compared to their male counterparts, which is also 
significant at p < 0.01 level. These two results together imply that the Khasi men have 
lower default rate than Bengali men. These results are similar to the ones obtained from 
comparing the Khasi and the Karbis. Figure 1.8 delineates the reversal of gender 
difference which is again like the one depicted in Figure 1.2. I formulate my next set of 
results. 
RESULT 6.1: Gender targeting reduce loan default on average, but there is significant 
heterogeneity across societies. 
RESULT 6.2: Women in matrilineal society have higher loan default than patrilineal 
Bengali women, compared to their male counterparts.  
RESULT 6.3: Group liability improve the microfinance lender’s bottom line. 
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Figure 1.8: Mean Loan Default Rates: Matrilineal Khasi vs. Patrilineal Bengali 
Table 1.12: Regression results for loan default for Khasi and Bengali sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Loan default Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
    
Female -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.13*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Group liability __ -0.08*** -0.09** 
  (0.02) (0.04) 
Group liability*Female  __ __ 0.01 
   (0.08) 
Group liability* Female* 
Matrilineal 
__ __ 0.01 
(0.07) 
Round fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 706 706 706 
R-squared 0.11 0.14 0.14 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
21%
6%
5%
12%
Patrilineal Bengali Matrilineal Khasi
Mean Default Rates
Male Female
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Table 1.13 and 1.14 analyze the channels which constitute gender difference in 
default.  Figure 1.9 delineates that the gender gap in risky project choice is much less 
among the Khasis than among the Bengalis. It also shows that the Khasi women are more 
likely to choose risky project than Bengali women. This is supported by the regression 
model (row 3 of Table 1.13), although the coefficient estimates are not significant once we 
control for risk preference. On the other hand, from Table 1.14 we see that even after 
controlling for risk attitude, previous experience with microfinance and other observable 
characteristics, Khasi women are almost 50% more likely to default strategically than 
Bengali women, compared to their male counterparts (significant at p<0.01 level).  It can 
also be seen from the visual depiction of Figure 1.10 which shows that Khasi women 
default strategically more than Bengali women and almost as much as Bengali men. On 
the other hand, Khasi men default strategically not only less than Bengali men but even 
less than Bengali women. Thus, I find that, on the whole, all my major results from 
comparing the matrilineal Khasis and patrilineal Karbi sample remains unchanged as I 
compare the Khasis to the patrilineal Bengalis. It leads me to the final result.  
RESULT 6.4: Women in matrilineal society default strategically more than women in 
patrilineal Bengali society, compared to their male counterparts.  
RESULT 6.5: Group liability leads to both ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard among 
borrowers. 
RESULT 6.6: The gender difference in behavior among borrowers is not an artifact of 
my particular choice of patrilineal sample. 
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Figure 1.9: Mean Risky Project Choice Rates: Matrilineal Khasi vs. Patrilineal Bengali 
 
 
Table 1.13: Regression results for risky project choice for Khasi and Bengali sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risky project choice Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
     
Female -0.32*** -0.27** -0.20** -0.14 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.04 -0.10 -0.04 0.003 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.19* 0.26** 0.17 0.16 
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
Group liability __ 0.35*** 0.31*** 0.35*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Group*Female __ -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 
  (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
Group*Female*Matrilineal __ -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
Investment risk behavior __ __ 0.38*** 0.39*** 
   (0.07) (0.06) 
67%
35%
64%
50%
Patrilineal Bengali Matrilineal Khasi
Risky Project Choice
Male Female
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Microfinance group member __ __ __ 0.02 
    (0.06) 
Borrower __ __ __ -0.02 
    (0.07) 
Individual level controls No No No Yes 
Round fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 706 706 706 706 
R-squared 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.18 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
                                      
Figure 1.10: Mean Strategic Default Rates: Matrilineal Khasi vs. Patrilineal Bengali 
 
 
 
 
 
10%
2% 3%
11%
Patrilineal Bengali Matrilineal Khasi
Strategic Default Rates
Male Female
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Table 1.14: Regression results for strategic default for Khasi and Bengali sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strategic default Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
     
Female -0.08** -0.02** -0.02** 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.07** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.16*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Group liability __ 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.52*** 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Group*Female __ -0.07* -0.07** -0.10** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
Group*Female*Matrilineal __ -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.32*** 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Investment risk behavior __ __ -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.03) (0.03) 
Microfinance group member __ __ __ -0.03 
    (0.03) 
Borrower __ __ __ 0.04* 
    (0.03) 
Individual level controls No No No Yes 
Round fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 558 558 558 558 
R-squared 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.22 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter evaluates the universal policy of gender targeting to mitigate 
microfinance loan default and provides an understanding of the underlying reasons for 
what drives such gender differences by exploiting the variation in social norms and gender 
roles across comparable matrilineal and patrilineal societies in India. I find that although 
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women on average display lower default, it is not a universal result. There is a reversal of 
gender effect across the two societies. Women in patrilineal society have lower default 
while matrilineal women have a higher default than their male counterparts.  I find that 
matrilineal women are more likely to invest in the risky project and default strategically 
more than patrilineal women. I also find that matrilineal women default strategically not 
only more than matrilineal men but even more than patrilineal men. Finally, I find that 
group liability leads to both ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard among the individual group 
members but reduces overall default due to risk sharing among them.  
In examining the alternative explanation of my results, I find that previous 
experience with microfinance and borrowing do not significantly predict behavior in the 
experiment and all the important coefficients remain unchanged regarding sign, 
significance, and magnitude after I control for previous experience. I implement an 
investment risk task and find that the variations in risk behavior among the subjects 
explain the heterogeneity in the gender difference of the choice of risky project but not 
strategic default between the two societies. I also find that all my main findings are robust 
to the particular choice of the patrilineal society and remain unchanged when I compare 
the Khasis with a mainstream patrilineal society called the Bengalis. These findings 
bolster my conclusion that behavior in the experiment is driven by the social context and 
the different roles that men and women play in various societies. However, my findings 
should still be interpreted with the caveat that I have sampled only a limited number of 
villages in a particular matrilineal region in India. I do not allege that my results will be a 
universal truth amongst all matrilineal societies. Rather I view my results as providing 
 49 
 
some initial insights into the underpinnings of the factors hypothesized to be important 
determinants of gender differences in behavior. 
My broad findings support the extant policy of gender targeting adopted by many 
MFIs around the world. However, my results reveal that gender targeting has a 
heterogeneous effect across societies. So, while it is true that women should be the 
preferred agent to pursue targeted policy actions in patrilineal societies, policymakers 
should be careful about generalizing a policy simply because it has worked in a particular 
context. While my experiment reveals a particular case where the social context can 
matter through gender relations and property rights, there may be many other ways social 
context can be important for policy and the policy makers should consider it to design 
better-targeted policies. Moreover, my results have implications for development policy 
beyond microfinance as women are the universally targeted agents in all policy measure 
pursued by governments and international donor agencies, from microfinance to 
conditional cash transfers, to health and education policies.  Thus, my paper suggests that 
in microfinance, and more broadly in all development policy spheres, policymakers 
should take into consideration the heterogeneity across societies and the social context in 
which the policy is implemented.  
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Chapter 2 
Gender, Group Liability and Moral Hazard in 
Microfinance 
 
2.1    Introduction 
 
Group liability is often cited as one of the key innovation responsible for the 
expansion of microfinance (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005; Daley-Harris, 
2009). The practice was pioneered by the Noble Laureate Muhammad Yunus and his 
Grameen Bank and has been replicated by numerous MFIs across the world. The rationale 
for the group liability or joint liability contracts is risk sharing among the group members, 
which reduces the lender's overall risk. Under group liability contracts, loans are made to 
individuals who are members of a borrowing group, but the whole group is liable if one 
or more group members default. Thus, group liability provides insurance to the lender 
against individual default risk. However, in recent years, many leading MFIs around the 
world like Association for Social Advancement in Bangladesh, the Bank Rakyat Indonesia, 
Banco Sol in Bolivia and even the Grameen Bank in its Grameen II program have moved 
away from group liability loans.   
Why are so many leading MFIs shifting away from group liability? It can be 
explained, at least partially, by the fact that the group liability contract structure can 
induce two types of moral hazard problems among the borrowers, ex-ante moral hazard 
and ex-post moral hazard. Ex-ante moral hazard refers to the notion that unobservable 
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actions or efforts are taken by borrowers which can affect the likelihood of a good project 
return. Typically, ex-ante moral hazard is associated with clients changing from a safe 
project to a risky project due to incentives from the loan contract (Gine et al., 2010). Since 
the risk of default due to project failure (involuntary or non-strategic default) for the 
entire group is lower under group liability contract than under individual liability 
contract, an individual group member may invest in a riskier project in pursuit of higher 
private payoff, thereby exhibiting ex-ante moral hazard behavior. Ex-post moral hazard 
occurs when an individual group member decides to default strategically after project 
returns are realized. Group liability can also cause ex-post moral hazard by providing free 
riding incentives to the clients. A group member may not repay the loan because she 
believes that another member will pay it for her. However, if all group members behave 
under this strategic assumption, then it leads to default for the entire group. Kono (2006) 
found evidence of such ex-post moral hazard by conducting field experiments in Vietnam.  
The study finds that group liability contracts engender serious free-riding problems, 
inducing strategic default and thereby lowering repayment rates. However, the setting of 
the experiment abstract from ex-ante moral hazard incentive by only including repayment 
choice but no project choice for the subjects. On the other hand, Gine et al. (2010) 
incorporates only ex-ante moral hazard incentive by including project choice but no 
repayment choice. They find that group liability increases repayment rate from 82 to 94 
percent.  However, none of these experiments tell us what happens when both types of 
moral hazard incentives are present under the same setting. This gap in the literature is 
filled by the experiments I report in chapter one of my dissertation. My results from 
chapter one show that group liability significantly increases the likelihood of both ex-ante 
 52 
 
and ex-post moral hazard behavior among the borrowers.  I find that an average borrower 
is 18% more likely to choose a riskier project and 35% more likely to default strategically 
under group liability contract.  
Many advocates of gender targeting in microﬁnance argue that behavior exhibiting 
moral hazard problem can be mitigated by providing loans to women instead of men since 
women are less prone to moral hazard. Beck et al. (2008) assert this conventional 
wisdom, “Experience has shown that repayment is higher among female borrowers, 
mostly due to more conservative investments and lower moral hazard risk."  It is argued 
in the literature that women are more disciplined and more risk averse than men and thus 
less subject to ex-ante moral hazard problems (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005; Beck et 
al., 2008). Another argument is that women are less prone to free riding behavior and are 
thus less subject to ex-post moral hazard problem (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2009). 
However, the empirical evidence from previous experiments in microfinance does not 
provide an unequivocal conclusion. Abbink et al. (2006) find lower strategic default for 
females, but the authors themselves suggest that their results should be interpreted with 
caution due to the relatively small number of independent observations and the non-
representative subject pool in their experiment (Abbink et al., 2006; p 15). Kono (2006) 
find female borrowers are in fact more prone to ex-post moral hazard. On the other hand, 
Gine et al. (2010) observe no gender difference in ex-ante moral hazard among borrowers.  
This chapter contributes to this literature by analyzing the interplay between the 
constituent components of default in microfinance and how to mitigate them. In 
particular, this chapter evaluates the policy of gender targeting to mitigate moral hazard 
problem in microfinance and to study the underlying reasons for what drives such gender 
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differences in moral hazard. Are women wired naturally to be less prone to moral hazard 
or is it the social context in which the gender roles operate that drive their moral hazard 
behavior? I address this question by following a similar methodology to chapter one. I 
design and conduct microfinance field experiments in two neighboring societies in India-  
the Khasi society in the East Khasi Hills district of Meghalaya and the Karbi society across 
the border in Karbi Anglong district of Assam.  As described in details in chapter one, the 
two societies are comparable regarding their socio-economic conditions, geography, 
shared history, religion, caste, education, primary occupation etcetera. They are also 
genetically closely related (Roychoudhury, 1992). However, the Khasi society is a 
matrilineal society while the Karbi society is a patrilineal society. Chapter one describes 
in details the differences in social norms and gender roles between the matrilineal Khasi 
and the patrilineal Karbi society. Conducting the same experiment in both the societies 
allows me to exploit the natural variation in social norms and gender roles across the two 
societies to compare between just a gender effect and an interaction effect of gender and 
social norms on moral hazard behavior.  
I take the first step in the literature to analyze the strategic interaction of the 
constituent components of default which is not explored in the prior work in microfinance 
experiments. The previous experiments in microfinance have focused primarily on only 
one of the two moral hazard channels through which default occurs while abstracting 
from the other.  The seminal experiment by Abbink et al. (2006) and Kono (2006) 
incorporates the possibility of only repayment choice (ex-post moral hazard) while Cason 
et al. (2009) and Gine et al. (2010) focuses entirely on project choice (ex-ante moral 
hazard). However, one channel may affect the other, and the final default is a combination 
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of both. In actual microfinance loan contracts, borrowers often decide both in which 
project to invest and whether to strategically default, and these two decisions may not be 
independent. My experiment decomposes the different moral hazard channels through 
which default occurs in microfinance. The experimental design incorporates three group 
liability game treatments. In all the three games, two individuals of the same gender are 
randomly matched and are liable for each other's loans. It means that both group 
members are liable if any one group member defaults, thus providing insurance to the 
lender against individual default risk. Among the three group liability games, one is a full 
game, and the other two are control games.  In the full game, each group member receives 
a loan and decides independently to invest it between a relatively safer project and a 
riskier project.  Due to group liability and risk sharing among the group members, each 
individual group member has an incentive of choosing riskier project for a higher return. 
This is the ex-ante moral hazard channel. Whether a project is successful is private 
information to the individual group members. If the project is successful, the group 
members decide simultaneously and independently to contribute to the group repayment 
or default strategically. Again, due to group liability, each individual group member has 
an incentive to default strategically and free ride off each other. This is the ex-post moral 
hazard channel. Chapter one shows evidence of both ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard 
among the subjects. The two control games in my experiment are similar to the full game 
except that in one control game, the subjects’ only make decision over project choice (ex-
ante moral hazard channel only) while in the other game, they only make decision over 
repayment choice (ex-post moral hazard channel only). My control game treatment with 
only repayment choice represents the settings of Abbink et al. (2006) and Kono (2006) 
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looking at ex-post moral hazard channel, and the control game with only project choice 
represents the baseline treatment of Gine et al. (2010) with ex-ante moral hazard channel. 
My experimental design can be viewed in this regard, as a generalized version of the 
previous experiments on moral hazard in microfinance.  
I reconcile the conventional wisdom on gender targeting with the previous 
experimental findings by analyzing the deconstructed and the full games to identify better 
the channels through which gender targeting operates in microfinance. Decomposing the 
moral hazard channels through which default occurs, I find that average default rates are 
highest in the ex-ante control game due to an increase in choice of risky project by women. 
The most important finding of this chapter is a reversal of gender effect across the 
matrilineal and patrilineal societies. I find that women in matrilineal society are 
significantly more prone to exhibit both types of moral hazard behavior than patrilineal 
women, compared to their male counterparts. This finding holds true even after 
controlling for individual characteristics such as age, education, profession, household 
information, religion, caste, trust behavior etcetera. Another significant finding is that 
matrilineal women become more prone to ex-post moral hazard when there is no 
possibility of ex-ante moral hazard channel and vice versa. Based on these findings, I 
argue that the gender difference in moral hazard behavior is driven by the difference in 
social context, norms and the gender roles between the matrilineal and the patrilineal 
societies. 
Similar to Chapter one, I examine three alternative explanations of my findings. 
The first is that the gender difference in moral hazard behavior between the matrilineal 
and patrilineal societies can be explained by the variation in risk behavior among them. 
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To address this, I implement an investment risk (IR) task to control for subject specific 
risk behavior. In the IR task, subjects choose which lottery to play out from a set of 
ordered lotteries that increase linearly in both expected payoff and risk. It allows me to 
explicitly control for the subject’s risk preference while analyzing her behavior in the 
microfinance games. I find that the variations in risk behavior among the subjects explain 
the heterogeneity in the gender difference in ex-ante, but not in ex-post moral hazard 
behavior between the two societies. The second explanation I consider is that the variation 
in moral hazard behavior among the subjects is driven by previous experience with 
microfinance and borrowing outside the experiment.  Those who are actual microfinance 
clients may behave systematically different than those who have no previous experience 
with microfinance or borrowing. To evaluate this explanation, I collect self- reported data 
on whether a subject is a member of a microfinance group and whether she has taken at 
least one loan. The summary of the data is provided in Table 2.1 and Figures 2.13 and 
2.14. I find that the subjects who have previously taken a loan are in general, less prone 
to moral hazard behavior. However, the heterogeneity in the gender difference in moral 
hazard behavior between the two societies cannot be explained by the subjects’ exposure 
to microfinance and experience with borrowing outside the experiment. The final 
explanation I consider is that the gender difference in moral hazard behavior is an artifact 
of comparing the matrilineal Khasis with the particular patrilineal Karbi society in my I 
study. One can argue that the proximity and shared culture and history of the Khasi and 
Karbi societies might influence the behavior of the subjects in a way that is not explicitly 
captured in the analysis. If the experiment is run with a mainstream patriarchal society, 
as opposed to a patrilineal indigenous tribe such as the Karbis, I might observe different 
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moral hazard behavior. To address this alternative explanation, I run the same 
microfinance games with Bengali men and women in the neighboring state of West 
Bengal. Unlike the Karbis, the Bengali society is a mainstream patrilineal society and the 
gender relation among them is representative of that of the rest of India as well as most 
of the developing world. All my principal findings on overall gender difference and 
heterogeneity analysis remain unchanged when I compare the matrilineal Khasis with the 
patrilineal Bengalis. This fortifies the robustness of my findings across the societies and 
reinforces my conclusion that gender difference in moral hazard is driven by the social 
context, norms and the gender roles in different societies.  
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. The next section describes the 
experimental design and presents an overview of the data comprising of the matrilineal 
and patrilineal societies. In Section 3, I report my main empirical results. Section 4 
discusses the alternative explanations. Section 5 discusses possible limitations and 
concludes. 
 
 
2.2 Experimental Design 
2.2.1 Data 
There are 414 subjects in total - 212 are female, and 202 are male; 238 Khasi and 
176 Karbi. To minimize the possibility of selection bias, I apply identical selection 
procedures in both the societies. Before going to the villages to conduct experiment, I 
randomly determine whether the village will have male session or female session. Then I 
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randomly determine which game (ex-ante, ex-post or full) will be played in the session. I 
followed this same procedure for both matrilineal and patrilineal villages. I invite the 
entire village, but only recruit one person per household, either male or female depending 
on the session. Subjects do not know the nature of the experiment till they participate.  
The subjects fill out a questionnaire for which they are paid. The questionnaire collects 
information about their individual characteristics summarized in Table 2.1. My average 
subject is 31 years old, have little over seven years of education and has about six 
household members. Two important individual level characteristics are religion and 
caste. Table 2.1 shows that all the subjects in both societies are either Christians or follow 
their indigenous tribal religion, although the distribution varies between the two societies. 
Also, at least 97% of both societies are schedule tribes which refer to disadvantaged 
indigenous people in the Indian caste system. About 50% of the males in my sample are 
the head of their households while only 18% of females are the same. This gender gap is 
significant in both societies, although the percentage of women household heads among 
Khasis (23%) are much more compared to Karbis (12%).  About 50% of the subjects live 
in temporary dwellings which are non-permanent constructions (‘kutcha’ house) such as 
mud houses. 77% of the Khasis have a bank account, while 64% of Karbis have the same. 
48% of Khasis and 68% of Karbis belong to a microfinance group. The corresponding 
figures are significantly higher for women in both the societies. 28% of the borrowers have 
taken out loans. These differences in observable characteristics on gender, both intra and 
intersociety, highlight that it is important to control for these factors when analyzing the 
data.
Table 2.1: Summary of individual level characteristics of subjects by gender and society 
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Individual  Overall Khasi Karbi 
characteristics Pooled Male Female Diff Pooled Male Female Diff. Pooled Male Female Diff. 
             
Age 31.72 
(10.6) 
30.07 
(9.57) 
33.29 
(11.28) 
-3.21*** 31.96 
(11.14) 
28.86 
(8.38) 
34.88 
(12.57) 
-6.01*** 31.41 
(9.82) 
31.71 
(10.7) 
31.13 
(8.82) 
0.58 
Education years 7.31 
(4.29) 
7.82 
(4.01) 
6.84 
(4.47) 
0.97*** 7.36 
(4.18) 
7.53 
(4.10) 
7.20 
(4.28) 
0.33 7.27 
(4.41) 
8.21 
(3.85) 
6.37 
(4.72) 
1.84*** 
Farmer 0.34 
(0.47) 
0.36 
(0.48) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.04* 0.26 
(0.44) 
0.25 
(0.43) 
0.27 
(0.44) 
-0.02 0.44 
(0.50) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.13*** 
Tribal religion 0.30 
(0.48) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
-0.16*** 0.21 
(0.41) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.27 
(0.44) 
-0.11*** 0.41 
(0.49) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
0.52 
(0.50) 
-0.23*** 
Christian 0.70 
(0.46) 
0.78 
(0.41) 
0.62 
(0.49) 
0.16*** 0.79 
(0.41) 
0.84 
(0.36) 
0.73 
(0.44) 
0.11*** 0.59 
(0.49) 
0.71 
(0.46) 
0.48 
(0.30) 
0.21*** 
Schedule tribe 0.98 
(0.15) 
0.97 
(0.18) 
0.99 
(0.10) 
-0.02*** 0.99 
(0.11) 
0.99 
(0.09) 
0.98 
(0.13) 
0.01 0.97 
(0.18) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
1 
(0) 
-0.07*** 
Ever married 0.69 
(0.46) 
0.57 
(0.50) 
0.79 
(0.41) 
-0.22*** 0.63 
(0.48) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.76 
(0.43) 
-0.26*** 0.76 
(0.43) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
0.83 
(0.37) 
-0.16*** 
I am household head 0.33 
(0.47) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.18 
(0.39) 
0.30*** 0.32 
(0.47) 
0.41 
(0.50) 
0.23 
(0.43) 
-0.18*** 0.35 
(0.48) 
0.58 
(0.49) 
0.12 
(0.33) 
0.46*** 
Household members 
 
6.24 
(2.45) 
6.36 
(2.50) 
6.14 
(2.39) 
0.22 6.19 
(2.37) 
6.33 
(2.28) 
6.06 
(2.45) 
0.28 6.32 
(2.55) 
6.39 
(2.79) 
6.24 
(2.30) 
0.15 
Lives in temporary 
dwellings 
0.48 
(0.49) 
0.45 
(0.49) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
-0.06** 0.60 
(0.50) 
0.59 
(0.50) 
0.61 
(0.49) 
-0.01 0.32 
(0.47) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
-0.12*** 
Holds a bank account 0.72 
(0.45) 
0.71 
(0.45) 
0.72 
(0.49) 
-0.01 0.77 
(0.42) 
0.78 
(0.42) 
0.77 
(0.42) 
0.01 0.64 
(0.50) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
0.66 
(0.48) 
-0.03 
Microfinance group 
member 
0.56 
(0.49) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.68 
(0.47) 
-0.24*** 0.48 
(0.50) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.57 
(0.50) 
-0.19** 0.68 
(0.47) 
0.52 
(0.50) 
0.82 
(0.38) 
-0.30*** 
Borrower 0.28 
(0.45) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
-0.01 0.21 
(0.40) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.25 
(0.44) 
-0.09*** 0.39 
(0.49) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
-0.11** 
No. of friends I trust 2.78 
(2.03) 
2.57 
(2.01) 
2.99 
(2.02) 
-0.42*** 2.71 
(2.01) 
2.50 
(1.92) 
2.93 
(2.01) 
-0.43*** 2.87 
(2.04) 
2.66 
(2.12) 
3.07 
(1.94) 
-0.41** 
N 414 202 212  238 116 122  176 86 90  
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2.2.2. Experimental Framework 
The design framework for the microfinance loan contract consists of the following 
setting.  A loan of 2L is provided to a group comprising of two members; where L ≥ 0. 
Each member of the group receives a loan of L. Both group members are jointly liable for 
the repayment of the loan under the group liability contract. The interest rate charged on 
loan is r (such that 0 < r <1). Each group member decides to invest the loan amount L in 
project X or project Y. Project X leads to a return of S (such that S > (1+r)2L) in the case 
of success with a probability of Ps and zero in the case of failure with a probability of (1-
Ps). Project Y leads to a return of R (such that R > S > (1+r)2L) in the case of success with 
a probability of PR and zero in the case of failure with a probability of (1- PR). To model 
joint liability in a simple and straightforward way, the debt of (1+r)2L is shared evenly 
among the group members who are able and willing to contribute. So, if both members 
repay, each will pay (1+r)L. Since contributions can only be financed from the current 
round's project payoffs, full repayment is only possible if at least one of the group 
members contribute. Only if the group fulfills its repayment obligation, does the game 
continue into a further round, which proceeds in the same way with the same group. 
 
2.2.3 Microfinance Games 
I implement three microfinance games- ex-ante group game, ex-post group game 
and full group game. Each subject participates in only one of the games. Groups are 
formed by randomly pairing two individual subjects of the same gender. The groups 
remain the same throughout the experiment, but the subjects are never revealed the 
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identities of the other group members. The full group game is same as the group game 
(GG) described in chapter one. In the full game, a group loan of 40 Indian Rupees (Rs) is 
provided for the repayment of which both group members are jointly liable. Each group 
member receives a loan of Rs 20 and decides to invest it in a relatively safer project X or 
a riskier project Y.  If project X is successful, the investor receives a payoff of Rs 60 while 
if project Y is successful she receives Rs 160. If either project fails, the investor receives 
zero. The probability of success of project X is 5/6 while that of project Y is 1/2. Thus, 
following Gine et al. (2010), the expected value of the risky project is higher than the 
expected value of the safe project. In Stiglitz’s (1990) model, safer projects are assumed 
to have higher expected returns than riskier projects. However, Gine et al. (2010) observe 
that in their experiment, participants were risk averse even over small stakes. When gross 
project returns were equal in expectation, risk aversion appeared to eliminate moral 
hazard, and most participants chose the safe project. Also, the fact that risky projects have 
higher expected returns than safe projects induces borrowers to make risky investments 
in pursuit of higher incomes, and this is a more realistic assumption than the alternate 
one (Gine et al., 2010).  
A simple lottery, following the one described in chapter one, is used to determine 
the status (success or failure) of the project. Each subject is presented with two buckets-
bucket X and bucket Y, each containing six balls. Bucket X contains five colored balls and 
one white ball while bucket Y contains three colored and three white balls. All the balls 
are identical in size, shape, and weight. Each subject chooses a bucket in private draws a 
ball from the chosen bucket without looking inside it. If she draws a colored ball, it 
indicates that her project is successful and she receives Rs 60 (if bucket X is chosen) or 
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Rs 160 (if bucket Y is chosen). However, if she draws a white ball from either of the 
buckets, it indicates that her project is not successful and she receives zero. Which bucket 
an individual subject chooses and what colored ball she draws is private information to 
her. This method of using a visual representation of probability using different 
distributions of white and colored balls is chosen due to its relative simplicity in 
communicating the concept of probability to a semi-literate subject.  
If a project is successful, group members have a choice to contribute to the group 
repayment or default strategically. The group is liable to repay a total amount of Rs 50. 
Due to joint liability, the group debt of Rs 50 is split equally among the group members 
who are able and willing to contribute. Thus, if both group members are willing and able 
to contribute then each must contribute Rs 25 to the group repayment. However, if one 
member defaults, the other group member has to repay the entire group loan of Rs 50. 
Since contributions can only be financed from the current round’s project payoffs, full 
repayment is only possible if at least one of the group members contribute. If the group 
as a whole fail to repay then, no further rounds are played, and the group members obtain 
no further payoffs. After each round, players are informed about their project payoff, their 
round payoff (comprised of one’s project payoff minus the players’ share of the repayment 
burden) and whether their partner contributed in the respective round. However, they 
are not provided any information about which project their partner chose, whether the 
project was successful and if success, whether the partner chose to default strategically. 
Thus, if their partner does not contribute, the subjects cannot distinguish between 
whether it is due to non-strategic default (project failure) or strategic default. The design 
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of the full game incorporates the possibility of both ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard for 
the subjects. 
The ex-ante and the ex-post control games are truncated versions of the full game. 
In the ex-ante game, the subjects decide only over project choice (project X or Y). The 
project probabilities and payoffs are the same as in the full game. However, if a project is 
successful, repayment is enforced by design. Thus, the ex-ante abstracts from ex-post 
moral hazard by design and only incorporates the possibility of ex-ante moral hazard. In 
the ex-post game, all subjects invest in project X by design (the option of project Y is not 
provided to them) and make decisions only over repayment choice. Thus, the ex-post 
abstracts from ex-ante moral hazard by design and only incorporates the possibility of ex-
post moral hazard. 
Upon arrival of the subjects, instructions are read aloud and explained in details 
to them. The wordings of the instructions are neutral to avoid any unobservable eﬀects of 
possible connotations and so that the subjects do not make decisions based on their past 
knowledge or behavior outside the experiment. In all the games, each subject participates 
in the experiment for three rounds. However, they are not informed about the number of 
rounds in advance to reduce end round effect.  Also, all groups in a session complete the 
procedure three times, even if their play ends earlier because of default.  It ensures that 
the constitution of the groups is not revealed by the diverging duration of the game (this 
will otherwise distort both anonymity and the statistical independence of the groups). 
Moreover, it also ensures that a preference for a short playing time cannot counteract the 
pecuniary incentives. The subjects are paid in private for all rounds at the end of the 
session.  
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2.3 Results 
 
2.3.1. Descriptive Analysis 
 
As depicted in Figure 2.1, the mean default rate in the ex-ante game is 23%, in the 
ex-post game is 11% and the full game is 7%. So, the ex-ante game has twice as much 
default as the ex-post game and more than three times average default than the full game. 
This may seem curious since the full game incorporates the possibilities of both ex-ante 
and ex-post moral hazard problems while the two control games only incorporate one of 
them. To understand it further, let's first compare the ex-post control game and the full 
game. In both the games, there is possibility of ex-post moral hazard since the subjects 
can strategically default. In addition, the full game contains the possibility of ex-ante 
moral hazard as the subjects can choose between the safer and the riskier projects. On the 
other hand, the ex-post control game abstains from any possibility of ex-ante moral 
hazard as everyone invests in the safer project X, by design. So, involuntary or non-
strategic default is lower on average in the ex-post game than in the full game, unless 
everybody in the full game chooses Project X (for example, more than 50% of subjects 
choose risky project Y in my experiment). Thus, if the rate of strategic default is same 
between the two games on average, then mathematically the average default should be 
lower in the ex-post game. However, what I observe is that the average default is 4% 
higher in the ex-post control game. I get an even sharper contrast when I compare the full 
game with the ex-ante control game. Since in both the games the subjects have the same 
choice of projects X and Y and the outcomes of the projects are randomly determined in 
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both the games, again the average default should be lower in the ex-ante control game as 
it has no possibility of strategic default by design. However, I observe a 16% higher default 
rate in the ex-ante game. These findings seem to suggest that behaviorally the subjects 
play the full game and the control games in different ways even though the control games 
are truncated versions of the full game.  Figure 2.2 shows the same result separately for 
men and women. The increase in average default from full game to ex-post game is driven 
entirely by women whereas the higher default in ex-ante game is driven equally by men 
and women. Figure 2.3 shows this result by society. I find that the matrilineal Khasi 
subjects have a higher default in the control games more than the patrilineal Karbi 
subjects. Figure 2.4 shows the average gender difference across societies by pooling all 
the games together. I find a reversal of gender effect across the matrilineal and the 
patrilineal societies. In the patrilineal Karbi society, the default rate for men is 18% while 
that for women is only 6%. In the matrilineal Khasi society, this pattern is reversed. The 
default rate for men is only 5% while that for women is 18%. Thus, I find that the 
matrilineal women and the patrilineal men have the same default rate, while the 
patrilineal women and the matrilineal men have a similar default on average.  
Table 2.2 helps us identify whether this reversal of gender effect is statistically 
significant. Column 1 of Table 2.2 shows the difference in means. Column 2 shows the p-
values using simple two-sample t-tests. However, I have multiple outcomes, treatments, 
and subgroups on which I want to conduct hypothesis testing, but the simple t-test does 
not account for it. Thus, column 3 reports multiplicity-adjusted p-values computed using 
Theorem 3.1 of List et al. (2016). Column 4 and 5 report p-values from the non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests to look at the difference between 
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the underlying distributions of the samples. I find that the gender difference in both 
matrilineal and patrilineal societies are significant in all the four tests. However, the 
direction of gender difference is opposite in the two societies, thereby suggesting evidence 
that the reversal of gender effect is statistically significant. Figure 2.5 helps to study the 
heterogeneity analysis by decomposing the default rate across games, gender, and society. 
I find that in the full game, the patrilineal men have the highest default rate (17%) whereas 
the matrilineal men have the lowest default rate (2%), and the women are in between. 
While the patrilineal men and women behave similarly in the ex-post game as they do in 
the full game, none of the matrilineal men default strategically, but the matrilineal women 
have a much higher default rate. Also, all subjects have a higher default in the ex-ante 
game, but the matrilineal women have the highest default among them.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Mean default rates: pooled by games 
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7%
Mean Default Rates
Ex-ante Game Ex-post Game
Full Game
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Figure 2.2: Mean default rates: pooled male vs. female by games 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Mean default rates: pooled Khasi vs. Karbi by games 
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Figure 2.4: Mean default rates: pooled games Khasi vs. Karbi 
 
                                 
Figure 2.5: Mean default rates: Khasi vs. Karbi by games 
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I now shift from looking at the overall loan default to decomposing the moral 
hazard channels. Figure 2.6 compares the gender difference in the ex-ante moral hazard 
channel in the full game and the ex-ante control game. I find that men choose the risky 
project 68% while women choose it 44% in the full game. In the ex-ante control game, 
both genders increase their choice of risky project, but the increase by women is much 
more than by men. Pooling both the games together, I find that men choose the risky 
project significantly more than women. Figure 2.7 and Table 2.2 shows that this overall 
gender gap is driven by the patrilineal Karbi society and there is no significant gender 
difference among the matrilineal Khasis. Figure 2.8 decomposes the gender difference 
across games and societies. In the full game, the patrilineal men choose the risky project 
twice as much as the patrilineal women. The corresponding gender gap is much smaller 
among the matrilineal Khasis. In the ex-ante control game, gender disparity closes for the 
patrilineal Karbis and almost reverses for the matrilineal Khasis. For both societies, 
women tend to choose the risky project much more in the ex-ante control game than in 
the full game.  
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Figure 2.6: Risky project choice: pooled male vs. female by games 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Risky project choice: pooled games Khasi vs. Karbi 
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Figure 2.8: Risky project choice: Khasi vs. Karbi by games 
 
Figure 2.9 compares the gender difference in the ex-post moral hazard channel in 
the full game and the ex-post control game. I find that men have a similar strategic default 
in both the games whereas women show very different behavior across the games. Women 
strategically default almost three times as much in the ex-post control game than in the 
full game. Pooling both the games together, I find that women are significantly more to 
ex-post moral hazard than men. Also, the matrilineal Khasis default strategically more 
than the patrilineal Karbis. Figure 2.10 shows that this result is driven by the matrilineal 
women, who default 19% more than the Khasi men. This finding is significant at p<0.01 
level in all the four tests reported in Table 2.2. In the patrilineal society, men strategically 
default significantly more than women, thus suggesting evidence of reversal of gender 
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effect. Figure 2.11 decomposes the gender difference across games and societies. In both 
the games, I find the pattern of reversal of gender effect across societies. However, this is 
much more prominent in the ex-post control game where none of the patrilineal women 
or the matrilineal men default strategically. The patrilineal men default 12% whereas the 
matrilineal women default 29%. Thus, the matrilineal Khasi women not only default 
strategically more than Khasi men but also more than patrilineal Karbi men. 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Strategic default: pooled male vs. female by games 
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Figure 2.10: Strategic default: pooled games Khasi vs Karbi 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Strategic default: Khasi vs. Karbi by game  
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Table 2.2: Parametric and non-parametric test for outcome variables 
  p-values 
Outcome Variables Difference 
in Means 
Simple 
Means 
test 
Multiplicity 
Adj. 
Mann-
Whitney  
K-S  
test  
Loan default      
Pooled male vs. female -0.03 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.99 
Pooled Khasi vs. Karbi -0.001 0.97 0.97 0.97 1 
Khasi male vs. female -0.13 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.008*** 
Karbi male vs. female 0.12 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.07* 
      
Risky project choice      
Pooled male vs. female 0.17 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Pooled Khasi vs. Karbi 0.18 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Khasi male vs. female 0.05 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.91 
Karbi male vs. female 0.30 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
      
 
Strategic default 
     
Pooled male vs. female -0.07 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.32 
Pooled Khasi vs. Karbi 0.07 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.40 
Khasi male vs. female -0.19 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Karbi male vs. female 0.09 0.00*** 0.01** 0.00*** 0.55 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2 Multiple Regression Analysis 
The first outcome variable is loan default which is a binary variable (1= loan goes 
unrepaid for group j in round t; 0=loan is repaid by group j in round t). Table 2.3 shows 
the result for all the games. Due to the dichotomous nature of my outcome variable, I 
consider both linear and non-linear regression framework. Column 1-3 shows results for 
linear regression while column 4-6 reports marginal coefficients using Probit model. The 
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standard errors are robust and clustered at the group level. When considering the pooled 
data from both the matrilineal Khasi and patrilineal Karbi sample, the coefficient 
estimates on female suggest that women are about 13 percent less likely to default than 
men on average and it is significant at p < 0.01 level. However, there is significant 
heterogeneity across societies. Row 3 of Table 2.3 shows that Khasi women are about 23 
percent more likely to default than Karbi women, compared to their male counterparts 
and it is also significant at p < 0.01 level. I find that, for both LPM and Probit model, the 
Khasis are about 17 percent less likely to default, which is significant at p < 0.01 level. 
However, as noted before, Khasi women are significantly more likely to default than Karbi 
women. These two results together imply that the Khasi men are less likely to default than 
Karbi men. Comparing the three games, I find that subjects are at least 10% more likely 
to default on average in the ex-ante game and it is significant at p < 0.1 level. However, 
when I interact the ex-ante game with female or Khasis, there is no significant effect. 
Pooling all the games together, I find that loan default increases significantly as the game 
moves to the third round. These findings together lead to my first set of results: 
RESULT 1.1: Women have lower loan default on average, but there is significant 
heterogeneity across societies. 
RESULT 1.2: Women in matrilineal society have higher loan default than patrilineal 
women, compared to their male counterparts.  
RESULT 1.3: Matrilineal Khasis have significantly lower loan default on average. 
RESULT 1.4: Average loan default is significantly higher in the ex-ante game. 
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Table 2.3: Linear regression and Probit estimation results for loan default (1= loan goes 
unrepaid, 0=loan is repaid) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Loan default LPM LPM LPM Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
       
Female -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.13*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.17*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Female*Matrilineal 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Ex-ante game __ 0.15*** 0.10 __ 0.13*** 0.10* 
  (0.04) (0.09)  (0.03) (0.06) 
Ex-post game __ 0.03 -0.06 __ 0.02 -0.05 
  (0.03) (0.06)  (0.03) (0.05) 
Female* Ex-ante game __ __ 0.01 __ __ -0.03 
   (0.08)   (0.07) 
Female* Ex-post game __ __ 0.10** __ __ 0.10 
   (0.05)   (0.06) 
Matrilineal* Ex-ante game __ __ 0.08 __ __ 0.07 
   (0.09)   (0.07) 
Matrilineal * Ex-post game __ __ 0.06 __ __ 0.03 
   (0.05)   (0.06) 
Round two 0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Round three 0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
0.12*** 
 (0.03) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
 (0.03) 
Observations 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 1,140 
R-squared 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.14 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
I now decompose the moral hazard channels. In my empirical model, I control for 
individual level demographic characteristics that have been shown to be important in 
previous studies such as age, years of education, profession, religion, caste, attitude 
towards trust, household information, whether the subject is head of the family, lives in a 
temporary dwelling and holds a bank account (see Table 2.1 for details about the control 
variables).   I start by analyzing only the first round of the game where all subjects are 
participating. Table 2.4 shows results for risky project choice in the first round. It is a 
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binary outcome that takes the value of 1 when the risky project Y is chosen by individual 
member i of group j and 0 when the safer project X is chosen by individual member i of 
group j in round 1. Similar to Table 2.3, I report results from both linear model and Probit 
estimation. I begin with a parsimonious specification where I regress the outcome only 
on a dummy variable for gender (one if the subject is female, zero otherwise), a dummy 
variable for society (one if the subject is Khasi, zero otherwise), the interaction of female 
and Khasi and a dummy variable for ex-ante group game (one if behavior is observed in 
the ex-ante group game treatment, zero otherwise). I cluster the robust standard errors 
at group level. In the second column, I add the interaction terms of female and ex-ante 
and matrilineal and ex-ante game. In the third column, the individual level controls are 
added. The fourth to six columns repeat the same for the probit specification.  The second 
row of Table 2.4 shows that there is no significant difference between the two societies for 
risky project choice. I find that women on average are less likely to choose the risky project 
by about 30 percent, and this finding is significant at p<0.01 level. However, it is entirely 
drawn by the patrilineal women. Row 3 of Table 2.4 substantiates this heterogeneity 
among women. It shows that the matrilineal Khasi women have 24% higher risky project 
choice than patrilineal Karbi women, compared to their male counterparts, which is 
significant at p<0.05 level. None of the individual characteristics, except religion, turn 
out to be significant. I find that those who are Christian are 14% less likely to choose the 
risky project, which is significant at p<0.05 level. Table 2.5 shows the results for the same 
outcome variable for all the rounds. I find that the sign, significance, and magnitude for 
most of the important variables remain the same as in the first-round analysis. I find that 
Khasi women are 15-20% more likely to choose the risky project than patrilineal Karbi 
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women, compared to their male counterparts, which is still significant at p<0.05 level.  I 
also find that the choice of risky project is higher in the ex-ante game. Once I control for 
observables, the coefficient, although still positive, is no longer significant. The same 
pattern is found when I interact female with ex-ante game. I find that women are more 
likely to choose the risky project in the ex-ante game than in the full game, although it is 
not significant once I control for individual characteristics. However, none of the 
individual characteristics turn out to be significant except the subject’s payoff till the 
present round. I find that for each additional rupee earned in the previous rounds, an 
average subject is 0.2% more likely to choose the risky project. I also find that an average 
subject is significantly less likely to choose the risky project in rounds 2 and 3 compared 
to the first round. I can now formulate my next set of results. 
RESULT 2.1: Women are less prone to ex-ante moral hazard on average, but there is 
significant heterogeneity across societies. 
RESULT 2.2: Women in matrilineal society choose the risky project significantly more 
than patrilineal women, compared to their male counterparts.  
Table 2.4: Linear regression and Probit estimation results for ex-ante moral hazard for 
round one only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risky project choice LPM LPM LPM Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
       
Female -0.29*** -0.33*** -0.34*** -0.28*** -0.32*** -0.34*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Female*Matrilineal 0.22* 0.20* 0.24** 0.21* 0.19* 0.24** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
Ex-ante game 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.01 
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 (0.06) (0.11) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) (0.12) 
Female* Ex-ante game __ 0.16 0.12 __ 0.15 0.11 
  (0.12) (0.13)  (0.12) (0.13) 
Matrilineal * Ex-ante game __ -0.04 0.03 __ -0.03 0.05 
  (0.13) (0.15)  (0.13) (0.14) 
Individual level controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 316 316 316 316 316 316 
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.07 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 2.5: Linear regression and Probit estimation results for ex-ante moral hazard for all 
rounds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risky project choice LPM LPM LPM Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
       
Female -0.30*** -0.33*** -0.29*** -0.27*** -0.30*** -0.26*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Matrilineal Khasi 0.05 0.04 -0.001 0.05 0.03 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Female*Matrilineal 0.22** 0.21** 0.18** 0.20** 0.19** 0.15** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Ex-ante game 0.16*** 0.05 0.05 0.17*** 0.05 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) 
Female* Ex-ante game __ 0.15* 0.08 __ 0.14* 0.07 
  (0.08) (0.07)  (0.08) (0.07) 
Matrilineal * Ex-ante game __ 0.05 0.09 __ 0.07 0.12 
  (0.09) (0.08)  (0.09) (0.08) 
Payoff till the present round __ __ 0.002*** __ __ 0.002*** 
   (0.0002)   (0.0003) 
Round two -0.04 -0.04 -0.18*** -0.04 -0.04 -0.16*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Round three 0.01 0.01 -0.26*** 0.02 0.02 -0.23*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Individual level controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 854 854 854 854 854 854 
R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.13 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Next, I study the ex-post moral hazard channel by analyzing strategic default as 
the outcome variable. It is also a binary outcome that takes the value of 1 when an 
individual member i of group j default strategically and 0 otherwise. Table 2.6 shows the 
result for only the first round. The coefficient estimates from Table 2.6 show that women 
are less likely to default strategically on average, although it is not significant. However, 
there is substantial heterogeneity among women between matrilineal and patrilineal 
societies. The coefficient estimates show that the matrilineal Khasi women are 11-19% 
percent more likely to strategically default than the patrilineal Karbi women, compared 
to their male counterparts, which is significant at p < 0.05 level.  The results similar but 
more pronounced when I analyze the data from all the rounds in Table 2.7. I find a 
significant gender difference in strategic default. The coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 
show that women are about 20% percent less likely to default strategically on average 
even after controlling for observable characteristics and it is significant at least at p < 0.05 
level.  However, there is substantial heterogeneity among women between matrilineal and 
patrilineal societies.  Figures 2.10 and 2.11 delineate the reversal of gender effect across 
the two societies. The coefficient estimates from Table 2.7 also show that the matrilineal 
Khasi women are 33 percent more likely to strategically default than the patrilineal Karbi 
women, compared to their male counterparts, which is significant at p < 0.01 level.  I do 
not find any overall difference in strategic default between the full game and the ex-post 
game. However, when I interact ex-post game with female, I find a significant difference. 
I find that women are 12% more likely to strategically default in the ex-post game than in 
the full game, even after controlling for other individual characteristics. It suggests that 
women are more prone to ex-post moral hazard when the ex-ante moral hazard channel 
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is blocked. Among the individual characteristics caste and living in a temporary dwelling 
turn out to be significant. Those who belong to a schedule tribe and live in a temporary 
dwelling are slightly more likely to default strategically. I find earnings in the previous 
rounds have no effect on strategic default. However, I find that an average subject is 
significantly more likely to strategically default by 11% in round 3 compared to the first 
round. This finding explains the increase in overall loan default in the third round. I now 
formulate my next set of results. 
RESULT 3.1: Women are less prone to ex-post moral hazard, but there is significant 
heterogeneity across societies. 
RESULT 3.2: Women in matrilineal society are more prone to ex-post moral hazard 
than women in patrilineal society, compared to their male counterparts.  
RESULT 3.3: Women are more prone to ex-post moral hazard when there is no 
possibility of ex-ante moral hazard.  
Table 2.6: Linear regression and Probit estimation results for ex-post moral hazard for 
round one only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Strategic default LPM LPM LPM Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
       
Female -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Female*Khasi 0.12** 0.12** 0.11** 0.19** 0.19** 0.19** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Individual level controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 266 266 266 173 173 168 
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.27 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.7: Linear regression and Probit estimation results for ex-post moral hazard for all 
rounds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Strategic default LPM LPM LPM Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
       
Female -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.19** -0.22*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.07** -0.09** -0.11*** -0.09** -0.08** -0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Female*Khasi 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Ex-post game 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Female* Ex-post game __ 0.09* 0.12** __ 0.10* 0.12** 
  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) 
Matrilineal * Ex-post game __ 0.05 0.02 __ -0.04 -0.08 
  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.05) 
Payoff till the present round __ __ -3.13e-05 __ __ -3.43e-05 
   (0.0002)   (0.0002) 
Round two 0.04* 0.04* 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Round three 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Individual level controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 746 746 746 746 746 728 
R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.25 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
2.4 Discussion on Alternative Explanations 
The main finding from Section 3 is that women in matrilineal society are more 
prone to moral hazard behavior than women in patrilineal society, compared to their male 
counterparts. Based on the findings, I argue that the gender difference in behavior is 
driven by the difference in social context, norms and the gender roles between the 
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matrilineal and the patrilineal societies. In this section, I will explore three alternative 
explanations. The first explanation is that the results are driven by the difference in risk 
behavior between the subjects. The second explanation is that the results are driven by 
the subject’s exposure to microfinance and experience with borrowing outside the 
experiment. The final explanation is that the results are an artifact of the particular choice 
of the patrilineal sample in my experiment and may not hold for a more mainstream 
patriarchal society. I will evaluate these alternative explanations one by one.  
 
2.4.1 Are differences in moral hazard behavior driven by variations in risk 
behavior among the subjects? 
One may allege that the variations in moral hazard behavior in the experiment can 
be explained by the variation in risk behavior among the subjects. Are the less risk-averse 
subjects more prone to moral hazard in the experiment? Are the gender differences in 
moral hazard behavior between the matrilineal and patrilineal societies due to a 
difference in their respective risk preferences? To answer these questions, I implement a 
simple investment risk (IR) task. It is the same IR task implemented in the experiment 
described in chapter one. All subjects in the experiment earn an endowment of Rs. 50 for 
filling up a questionnaire. In the IR task, the subjects choose what portion of their earned 
endowment to invest in a risky lottery. The lottery returns three times the amount 
invested with a 50 percent chance and nothing otherwise. They keep the amount not 
invested in the lottery. It is equivalent to choosing which lottery to play out from a set of 
ordered lotteries presented to the subject that increases linearly in expected payoff and 
standard deviation. The standard deviation associated with each lottery measures the risk 
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of that lottery. Given this parameter, a risk neutral (or risk-seeking) subject should invest 
the entire endowment. I show the CRRA range of the subjects based on the following 
CRRA specification: 𝑈(𝑥)  =  
𝑥1−𝑟
1−𝑟
  ,    when r ≠ 1 and log (x) when r = 1; where r is the relative 
risk aversion parameter.     
 
Table 2.8: Investment risk lotteries with CRRA calculations 
Lottery 
number 
Proportion of earned 
endowment invested 
High 
payoff  
Low 
payoff  
Expected 
value 
Standard 
deviation  
CRRA Range 
       
1 0 
 
50 50 50 
 
0 2.49 < r 
2 0.2 70 40 55 15 0.84 < r < 2.49 
       
3 0.4 90 30 60 30 0.5 < r < 0.84 
       
4 0.6 110 20 65 45 0.33 < r < 0.5 
       
5 0.8 130 10 70 60 0.18 < r < 0.33 
       
6 1 150 0 75 75 r < 0.18 
       
 
I start by looking at the gender difference in risk behavior across the two societies.  
Figure 2.12 shows the proportion of earned endowment invested in the risky lottery. I find 
that in the patrilineal society, men invest twice as much as women in the risky lottery 
whereas in the matrilineal society there is no gender difference in investment. Table 2.9 
shows the result from the IR task in a regression framework. I start with a parsimonious 
specification and add controls for individual characteristics in the full model. Since the 
investment risk task takes place after the microfinance game in all my experimental 
sessions, the earnings from the microfinance game rounds may influence the amount 
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invested in the lottery. Thus, my individual level controls also include the microfinance 
round earnings for each subject. I find that although statistically significant, the 
coefficient estimate of the microfinance round earning is 0.001 which can be considered 
negligible and therefore economically insignificant. I also find that those who live in a 
temporary dwelling are more risk averse. I find that women on average invest 32 percent 
less of their earned endowment in a risky lottery, which is significant at p < 0.01 level. 
However, as it is evident from Figure 2.12, this result is entirely driven by the patrilineal 
women. I find that the matrilineal women invest 32 percent more than the patrilineal 
women, compared to their male counterparts. I do not find any significant difference in 
investment between the overall matrilineal and patrilineal societies. I formulate my next 
set of result. 
RESULT 4.1: Women are more risk averse on average, but there is significant 
heterogeneity across societies. 
RESULT 4.2: Women in matrilineal society are less risk averse than women in 
patrilineal society, compared to their male counterparts.  
 86 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Risk behavior: Khasi vs. Karbi 
 
 
Table 2.9: Linear regression results for investment risk task 
 
Investment risk behavior 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
   
Female -0.39*** -0.32*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.39*** 0.33*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Individual level controls No  Yes 
Observations 414 414 
R-squared 0.19 0.25 
Robust standard errors, clustered at individual level, in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
75%
37%
72% 73%
Patrilineal Karbi Matrilineal Khasi
Investment in Risky Lottery
Male Female
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I now analyze if this gender difference in risk behavior drives the gender difference 
in moral hazard behavior. First, I focus on ex-ante moral hazard. Table 2.10 shows the 
results from a Probit estimation model. I find that investment risk behavior is a significant 
predictor of ex-ante moral hazard behavior. The coefficient estimates show that the 
subjects who invest 20% more of their endowment in the risky lottery are 33% more likely 
to choose the risky project in the microfinance game. This finding is significant at p<0.01 
level, even after controlling for other individual characteristics. Thus, the subjects who 
are less risk averse are more likely to exhibit ex-ante moral hazard behavior. This 
difference in risk behavior does not completely explain the overall gender difference in 
choice of risky project. When we do not control for risk behavior, women are 30% less 
likely to choose the risky project in the pooled sample (see Table 2.8). After controlling 
for risk behavior, the coefficient drops to 14%. However, it is still significant at p<0.05 
level. Let’s now focus on the heterogeneity analysis. Column 1 of Table 2.10 shows that 
the matrilineal women are 23% more likely to choose the risky project than the patrilineal 
women, compared to their male counterparts, and it is significant at p<0.01 level. Once I 
control for investment risk behavior, the coefficient estimate drops to 6% and is no longer 
significant. Figure 2.12 delineates that the matrilineal women invest in the risky lottery 
almost twice as much as the patrilineal women. This substantial difference in their risk 
behavior seems to explain the variations in their moral hazard behavior. Table 2.11 shows 
the results for ex-post moral hazard. Unlike for ex-ante moral hazard, I find that 
investment risk behavior is not a significant predictor of ex-post moral hazard behavior. 
The difference in risk behavior neither explain the overall gender difference nor the 
heterogeneity across societies in ex-post moral hazard behavior. Even after controlling for 
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risk behavior and other individual characteristics, matrilineal women are 32% more likely 
to default strategically than patrilineal women, compared to their male counterparts. 
Moreover, this result remains significant at p<0.01 level. These findings lead to my next 
set of results.  
RESULT 4.3: Subjects who are less risk averse are more prone to ex-ante but not ex-
post moral hazard.  
RESULT 4.4: Variations in risk behavior significantly explain the heterogeneity in the 
gender difference in ex-ante, but not in ex-post moral hazard behavior between the two 
societies.  
 
Table 2.10: Probit estimation results for the effect of risk behavior on ex-ante moral 
hazard 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risky project choice Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
     
Female -0.28*** -0.13* -0.16** -0.14** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Matrilineal Khasi 0.05 0.06 0.05 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.23*** 0.07 0.04 0.06 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Investment risk behavior __ 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.33*** 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Ex-ante game __ __ 0.06 0.06 
   (0.07) (0.07) 
Female* Ex-ante game __ __ 0.13* 0.03 
   (0.07) (0.07) 
Matrilineal * Ex-ante game __ __ 0.039 0.12 
   (0.08) (0.08) 
Payoff till the present round __ __ __ 0.002*** 
    (0.0003) 
Round two -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.14*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
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Round three 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.19*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Individual level controls No No No Yes 
Observations 854 854 854 854 
R-squared 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.14 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 2.11: Probit estimation results for the effect of risk behavior on ex-post moral hazard 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strategic default Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
     
Female -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.19** -0.22*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.09** -0.09** -0.08** -0.10*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Investment risk behavior __ 0.02 0.012 0.02 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ex-post game __ __ -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.04) (0.04) 
Female* Ex-post game __ __ 0.10* 0.12** 
   (0.05) (0.05) 
Matrilineal * Ex-post game __ __ -0.04 -0.08 
   (0.06) (0.05) 
Payoff till the present round __ __ __ -4.89e-05 
    (0.0002) 
Round two 0.03* 0.03* 0.03 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Round three 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Individual level controls No No No Yes 
Observations 746 746 746 728 
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.25 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.4.2 Are the results driven by previous experience with microfinance and 
borrowing by the subjects? 
One may reasonably argue that the differences in moral hazard behavior in the 
experiment are driven by the variations in the subjects’ experience with microfinance and 
borrowing outside the experiment. Those who are actual microfinance clients behave 
systematically different than those who have no previous experience with microfinance 
or borrowing. I attempt to mitigate the influence of prior exposure to microfinance on 
behavior in the experiment through the design of my instructions. I use a neutral 
presentation without giving a microﬁnance context when explaining the games. I now 
analyze the data to evaluate if the variations in the moral hazard of the subjects can be 
explained by their exposure to microfinance and experience with borrowing outside the 
experiment. Figure 2.13 shows that in both the societies there are about 20% more women 
microfinance group members than men. This is not surprising as women constitute more 
than 80% of all microfinance clients worldwide (D’Espallier et al., 2011). Figure 2.14 
shows the variation in borrowers among the subjects. A borrower is defined as a subject 
who has taken at least one loan outside the experiment. In the patrilineal society, there 
are 11% more men borrowers while in the matrilineal society there are 11% more female 
borrowers.  
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Figure 2.13: Microfinance Group Member: Khasi vs. Karbi 
 
 
Figure 2.14: Previous Borrower: Khasi vs. Karbi 
52%
82%
38%
57%
Patrlineal Karbi Matrlineal Khasi
Microfinance Group Member
Male Female
44%
33%
16%
25%
Patrilineal Karbi Matrilineal Khasi
Borrower
Male Female
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I will now examine whether these variations in exposure to microfinance and 
experience with borrowing among the subjects explain their moral hazard behavior in the 
experiment. Table 2.12 shows results for ex-ante moral hazard. I find no overall effect of 
being a microfinance group member on ex-ante moral hazard behavior. However, women 
microfinance group members are 21% more likely to choose the risky project than women 
non-members, compared to their male counterparts. This finding is significant at p<0.01 
level, even after controlling for individual characteristics and risk behavior. I also find 
that a subject who has taken a loan is significantly less prone to ex-ante moral hazard. 
However, the overall effect and the heterogeneity in gender effect in ex-ante moral hazard 
behavior remains unchanged even after I control for experience with microfinance and 
previous borrowing. By comparing the results from Table 2.4 and Table 2.12, I find that 
in both the models, women are less prone to ex-ante moral hazard in the pooled sample, 
whereas the matrilineal women are significantly more prone to ex-ante moral hazard than 
the patrilineal women, compared to their male counterparts. Table 2.13 shows results for 
ex-post moral hazard. Here I find neither any overall effect of being a microfinance group 
member nor when I interact it with gender. I find that those who have taken loans are 
slightly less likely to default strategically. I also find that controlling for being a 
microfinance group member and borrower do not change results on overall gender 
difference and heterogeneity analysis compared to what I find in Table 2.6.  Thus, on the 
whole, all my major results remain unchanged after I control for whether the subject 
belongs to a microfinance group and borrowing. It leads me to the next result.  
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RESULT 5.1: Subjects who have taken a loan are less prone to moral hazard behavior.  
RESULT 5.2: The heterogeneity in the gender difference in moral hazard behavior 
between the two societies cannot be explained by the subjects’ exposure to microfinance 
and experience with borrowing outside the experiment. 
Table 2.12: Probit estimation results for the effect of experience with microfinance on ex-
ante moral hazard 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risky project choice Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
     
Female -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.35*** -0.31*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) 
Matrilineal Khasi 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.16** 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) 
Microfinance group member __ -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 
  (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) 
Borrower __ -0.15*** -0.15* -0.18*** 
  (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
Female* member __ __ 0.09 0.21*** 
   (0.08) (0.06) 
Female* borrower __ __ -0.01 0.09 
   (0.10) (0.07) 
Investment risk behavior __ __ __ 0.35*** 
    (0.05) 
Ex-ante game __ __ __ 0.17*** 
    (0.04) 
Payoff till the present round __ __ __ 0.002*** 
    (0.0003) 
Round two -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.14*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Round three 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.19*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Individual level controls No No No Yes 
Observations 854 854 854 854 
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.16 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.13: Probit estimation results for the effect of experience with microfinance on ex-
post moral hazard 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strategic default Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
     
Female -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.15** -0.16** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.09** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.13*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Microfinance group member __ -0.01 0.002 -0.04 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Borrower __ -0.03 -0.05 -0.06* 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Female* member __ __ -0.03 -0.02 
   (0.04) (0.04) 
Female* borrower __ __ 0.04 0.04 
   (0.04) (0.04) 
Investment risk behavior __ __ __ 0.02 
    (0.03) 
Ex-post game __ __ __ 0.01 
    (0.02) 
Payoff till the present round __ __ __ -3.91e-05 
    (0.0002) 
Round two 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Round three 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Individual level controls No No No Yes 
Observations 746 746 746 728 
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.26 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.4.3 Are the results an artifact of my particular choice of the patrilineal  
sample? 
Although I have controlled for a host of observable characteristics to compare 
across the matrilineal and patrilineal societies in my empirical model, one might argue 
that the proximity and shared culture and history of the Khasi and Karbi societies might 
influence the behavior of the subjects in a way that is not explicitly captured in my 
empirical analysis. Thus, the gender difference in moral hazard behavior across societies 
is only an artifact of comparing the matrilineal Khasis with the patrilineal Karbis and 
cannot be generalized to other patriarchal societies. To address this alternate explanation, 
I conduct the same experiments with Bengali men and women in the Dooars region in the 
neighboring state of West Bengal, about 300 miles away from the East Khasi Hills. The 
Khasis of Meghalaya and the Bengalis of West Bengal were never part of the same state. 
Moreover, the Bengalis are not an indigenous tribe like the Karbis. The Bengali society is 
a mainstream society and the gender relation among them is representative of that of the 
rest of India as well as most of the developing world. Figure 2.15 shows the average gender 
difference in loan default across matrilineal Khasis and the patrilineal Bengalis. Figure 
2.16 decomposes Figure 2.15 by games. I find similar patterns of gender difference in 
default rate across games and societies when I compare it to Figure 2.5 that illustrates the 
same for Khasis and Karbis. Evaluating results from Tables 2.14 and 2.3, I find that all the 
main findings for loan default remain unchanged when I compare the matrilineal Khasis 
with the patrilineal Bengalis. Women are less likely to default than men on average, and 
Khasi women are more likely to default than Bengali women compared to their male 
counterparts. 
 96 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Mean default rates: pooled games Khasi vs. Bengali 
 
 
Figure 2.16: Mean default rates: Khasi vs. Bengali by games 
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Table 2.14: Probit estimation results for loan default for matrilineal Khasi and patrilineal 
Bengali sample  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Loan default Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
    
Female -0.09** -0.10** -0.13** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.18*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Ex-ante game __ 0.14*** 0.09* 
  (0.03) (0.05) 
Ex-post game __ 0.03 -0.08 
  (0.03) (0.07) 
Female* Ex-ante game __ __ 0.01 
   (0.06) 
Female* Ex-post game __ __ 0.13** 
   (0.06) 
Matrilineal * Ex-ante game __ __ 0.07 
   (0.06) 
Matrilineal * Ex-post game __ __ 0.03 
   (0.07) 
Round two 0.04 0.04 0.05* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Round three 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 
R-squared 0.12 0.18 0.19 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
I now decompose the moral hazard channels. Figure 2.17 and Table 2.15 shows that 
women are less prone to ex-ante moral hazard on average, but there is heterogeneity 
across societies. Figure 2.18 shows that women from both Khasi and Bengali societies 
choose risky project more in the ex-ante game. It is confirmed by Table 2.15 where the 
coefficient estimate for the interaction of female and ex-ante game show that women are 
about 20% more likely to choose the risky project in the ex-ante game than in the full 
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game. Figure 2.19 indicates the reversal of gender difference in strategic default between 
the Khasis and the Bengalis. Figure 2.20 illustrates that in the ex-post game Bengali 
women and Khasi men have zero strategic default whereas the Khasi women default 
strategically more than Bengali men. It is the same finding as when we compare the 
Khasis with the Karbis. Results from Table 2.16 suggest that women are less prone to ex-
post moral hazard in the pooled sample, but there is significant heterogeneity across the 
Khasi and the Bengali societies.  The coefficient estimates show that the Khasi women are 
about 33 percent more likely to strategically default than the Bengali women, compared 
to their male counterparts, which is significant at p < 0.01 level.  This coefficient estimate 
and the level of significance is exactly the same as when we compare the results between 
Khasis and Karbis in Table 2.9. Thus, all my major results on overall gender difference 
and heterogeneity analysis remain unchanged when I compare the matrilineal Khasis 
with the patrilineal Bengalis. This fortifies the robustness of my findings across the 
societies and leads to the final set of results.  
RESULT 6.1: Women are less prone to moral hazard on average, but there is 
significant heterogeneity across societies. 
RESULT 6.2: Women in matrilineal Khasi society are more prone to moral hazard 
than patrilineal Bengali women, compared to their male counterparts.  
RESULT 6.3: The gender difference in moral hazard across the matrilineal and the 
patrilineal societies is not an artifact of my particular choice of patrilineal sample. 
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Figure 2.17: Risky project choice: pooled games Khasi vs. Bengali 
 
                                   
Figure 2.18: Risky project choice: Khasi vs. Bengali by games 
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Table 2.15: Probit estimation results for ex-ante moral hazard for all rounds: Matrilineal 
Khasi vs. Patrilineal Bengali  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risky project choice Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
     
Female -0.25*** -0.33*** -0.20*** -0.12* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.05 -0.11 -0.07 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.18** 0.19** 0.08 0.03 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
Ex-ante game 0.14*** -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Female* Ex-ante game __ 0.24*** 0.18*** 0.16** 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
Matrilineal * Ex-ante game __ 0.14* 0.10 0.12* 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Investment risk behavior __ __ 0.38*** 0.34*** 
   (0.05) (0.05) 
Microfinance group member __ __ -0.03 -0.02 
   (0.04) (0.04) 
Borrower __ __ -0.03 -0.05 
   (0.06) (0.05) 
Payoff till the present round __ __ __ 0.001*** 
    (0.0003) 
Round two 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Round three 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
Individual level controls No No No Yes 
Observations 764 764 764 764 
R-squared 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.14 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 2.19: Strategic default: pooled games Khasi vs Bengali 
 
Figure 2.20: Strategic default: Khasi vs. Bengali by game 
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Table 2.16: Probit estimation results for ex-post moral hazard for all rounds: Matrilineal 
Khasi vs. Patrilineal Bengali 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strategic default Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ Probit+ 
     
Female -0.15*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Matrilineal Khasi -0.15*** -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.13** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Female* Matrilineal 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Ex-post game 0.01 -0.08* -0.09** -0.09* 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Female* Ex-post game __ 0.10** 0.12** 0.10** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Matrilineal * Ex-post game __ 0.03 0.04 0.02 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Investment risk behavior __ __ 0.01 0.04 
   (0.04) (0.04) 
Microfinance group member __ __ -0.03 -0.02 
   (0.03) (0.03) 
Borrower __ __ 0.03 0.02 
   (0.02) (0.03) 
Payoff till the present round __ __ __ -0.0002 
    (0.0002) 
Round two 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Round three 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Individual level controls No No No Yes 
Observations 652 652 652 650 
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.22 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter takes the first step in the literature to analyze the interplay between 
the constituent components of loan default in microfinance and how to mitigate it.  In 
doing so, it uncovers important mechanisms of the relationship between gender and 
moral hazard. By implementing different contract structures, my experimental design 
decomposes ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard channels through which gender targeting 
can influence default and compare them across different societies.  I find that average 
default rates are highest in the ex-ante control game due to an increase in choice of risky 
project by women. The most important finding of this chapter is a reversal of gender effect 
across the matrilineal and patrilineal societies. Women in matrilineal society are more 
prone to both types of moral hazards than patrilineal women, compared to their male 
counterparts. The matrilineal women also become more prone to ex-post moral hazard 
when there is no possibility of ex-ante moral hazard channel and vice versa. I illustrate 
that the gender difference in moral hazard behavior between the two societies cannot be 
explained by the subjects’ exposure to microfinance and experience with borrowing 
outside the experiment. I implement an investment risk task and find that the variations 
in risk behavior among the subjects explain the heterogeneity in the gender difference in 
ex-ante, but not in ex-post moral hazard behavior between the two societies. Finally, I 
find that the gender difference in moral hazard between the matrilineal Khasi and the 
patrilineal Karbi societies is not an artifact of my particular choice of patrilineal sample. 
All my principal findings on overall gender difference and heterogeneity analysis remain 
unchanged when I compare the matrilineal Khasis with another patrilineal society, the 
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Bengalis. It reinforces my conclusion that gender difference in moral hazard is driven by 
the difference in social context, norms and the gender roles between the matrilineal and 
the patrilineal societies. 
However, my conclusion above should be interpreted with the following 
methodological caveat that I cannot estimate ‘treatment effects’ of gender and society in 
the sense of ‘using randomization to achieve identification.’ I have used the following 
simple empirical model in my analysis: 𝑌 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ∗
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑙 + 𝛾𝑀𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒 + 𝛿𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒 + 𝜗𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑙 ∗ 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒 + 𝑋𝜏 + 𝜖, 
where Y is the outcome of interest (loan default, risky project choice, strategic default), X 
is a vector of individual-specific variables excluding gender and society, Female is the 
gender dummy, Matrilineal is the society dummy, MicrofinanceGame is the treatment 
variable (ex-ante game, ex-post game, full game), 𝜖 is the error component and 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, 
𝛾, 𝛿, 𝜗 and 𝜏 are estimated parameters. In this analysis, I can use a causal interpretation 
for 𝛾 since I randomize subjects into one of three microfinance games in a controlled 
experiment. However, I cannot use a similar causal interpretation for my most interesting 
estimates, that of 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3  on gender, society and their interaction. This is because 
neither gender nor society is randomly assigned. Thus, my results should be viewed as 
providing some initial insights into the underpinnings of the societal and cultural factors 
conjectured to be important determinants of gender differences in moral hazard and 
highlighting the importance of further research in this direction.  
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Chapter 3 
What Drives Gender Differences in Trust and 
Trustworthiness? Evidence from Matrilineal and Patrilineal 
Societies in India 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
A large body of literature explores the role of trust and trustworthiness in economic 
activities (Fukuyama 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; La Porta, 1997; Putnam 2000, Fehr, 
2009). It focuses primarily on the mechanism of transaction cost, as echoed in the 
following statement;  “Economic activities that require some agents to rely on the future 
actions of others are accomplished at lower cost in higher trust environments” (Knack 
and Keefer, 1997). One interesting questing that follows from the above statement is 
whether the degree of trust and thereby the transaction costs differ when the agent is a 
man versus when she is a woman? The existence of such gender differences in trust 
behavior can have important implications for economic performance. However, the 
evidence so far from the experimental literature that measures gender variations in trust 
and trustworthiness is mixed at best (Buchan et al.,  2008). A  number of  studies find 
that men are more trusting than women (Eckel and  Wilson,  2004b;  Chaudhuri and  
Gangadharan,  2007; Buchan et al.,  2008), while  Bellemare and Kröger (2003) find 
women to be more trusting than  men. Other studies  find either no gender  differences in  
trusting behavior  (Croson and Buchan,  1999; Schwieren and   Sutter,  2008) or that it 
depends on other factors such as social distance and payoff level  (Cox and  Deck, 2006). 
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Similar mixed pattern is observed for the gender difference in reciprocity or 
trustworthiness. While some studies have found that women are more reciprocal or 
trustworthy than men (Croson and Buchan, 1999; Chaudhuri and Gangadharan, 2007; 
Schwieren and Sutter, 2008), Bellemare and Kroger (2007), finds that men are more 
trustworthy than women and Eckel and Wilson (2004b) finds no gender differences in 
trustworthiness. Thus, there is no consensus in the literature either on the existence or in 
the direction of the gender difference in trust and trustworthiness. Instead of continuing 
to search for the existence of a universal gender difference, this study contributes to the 
literature by examining which underlying factors drive gender differences in behavior. In 
particular, I wish to examine the inﬂuence of social context, norms and gender roles on 
differences in behavior between men and women. The social role theory of gender 
differences suggests that most behavioral differences between men and women are the 
result of social and cultural stereotypes about gender, that is, behaviors we expect to see 
from men and women in a particular society (Dulin, 2007). Thus, societal and cultural 
variations in norms and gender roles will influence gender differences in behavior across 
different types of societies as opposed to the existence of a universal gender difference. 
The purpose of this chapter is to study what drives the gender difference in trust 
and trustworthiness. Are women wired naturally to be more trusting and trustworthy 
than men or is it the social context in which the gender roles operate that motivate their 
behavior? I conduct trust experiments in two neighboring societies in India, the 
matrilineal Khasi society and the neighboring patrilineal Karbi society. As described in 
details in chapter one, the two societies are comparable regarding their socio-economic 
conditions, geography, shared history, religion, caste, education, primary occupation 
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etcetera. They are also genetically closely related (Roychoudhury, 1992). Chapter one also 
describes in details the differences in social norms and gender roles between the 
matrilineal Khasi and the patrilineal Karbi society. Running the same experiment in these 
two matrilineal and patrilineal societies allows me to compare between a gender effect 
and the interaction effect of gender and underlying social norms on trust and 
trustworthiness.  
The previous studies that are closest to mine are Gong et al. (2015), Andersen et al. 
(2008) and Gneezy et al. (2009). Gong et al. (2015) conduct dictator game experiment 
with the matrilineal Mosuo society and the patrilineal Yi society in China. They ﬁnd no 
gender difference in the patrilineal society but observe that men donate more than twice 
of what women do in the matrilineal society. The authors argue for the importance of 
societal factors in shaping the gender differences in pro-social behavior. Andersen et al. 
(2008) have run experiments with the same matrilineal society as in my study, that is, the 
Khasis of Meghalaya but examining the contribution to the provision of public good. They 
report that provision to public good is higher in the matrilineal society compared to the 
two patrilineal societies in Assam, and this result is driven by the higher contribution of 
the matrilineal Khasi men, rather than a difference in female contribution across the 
societies. Gneezy et al. (2009) look at gender and competition among matrilineal Khasis 
of Meghalaya and the patriarchal Maasai society of Tanzania. They observe that while 
Maasai men are more competitive than Maasai women, this result is reversed among the 
Khasi, where women choose to compete more than men. These studies have provided 
crucial insights on the importance of social context as a source of gender differences in 
behavior.  
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My experimental design incorporates the double-anonymous investment game by 
Berg et al. (1995) where the first mover (FM) can send money to the second mover (SM) 
which is tripled by the experimenter, and the second mover then has the opportunity to 
return money to the FM. In this game, trust is usually measured by the amount sent by 
the FM and trustworthiness is measured by the amount returned by the SM to the 
anonymously paired FM. However, there can be other possible motivations such as 
unconditional altruism (Cox 2004), risk preferences (Crosson and Gneezy 2009) and 
betrayal aversion (Bohnet et al.). In this chapter, I will focus on the confound between 
trust and risk. To address this confound, I implement an investment risk (IR) task to 
control for subject specific risk attitude. In the IR task, subjects choose which lottery to 
play out from a set of ordered lotteries that increase linearly in both expected payoff and 
risk. It allows me to explicitly control for the subject’s risk attitude while analyzing her 
behavior in the investment game.  
I find that on average the matrilineal subjects are more trusting as well as more 
trustworthy than the patrilineal subjects. However, there is substantial heterogeneity 
between the matrilineal and patrilineal societies. Women in matrilineal society are both 
less trusting and less trustworthy than patrilineal women, compared to their male 
counterparts. This finding holds true even after controlling for risk preference and other 
individual characteristics such as age, education, profession, household information, 
religion, caste, subjective trust responses etcetera. It suggests that societal structure is 
crucially linked to the observed gender differences in trust and trustworthiness.  
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. The next section describes the 
experimental design and presents an overview of the data comprising of the matrilineal 
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and patrilineal societies. In Section 3, I discuss my main empirical results. Section 4 
highlights the possible limitations and extensions of the study and concludes. 
 
 
 
3.2 Experimental Design 
 
3.2.1 Data 
There are 136 subjects in total - 68 are female, and 68 are male; 64 Khasi and 72 
Karbi. To minimize the possibility of selection bias, I apply identical selection procedures 
in both the societies. Before going to the villages to conduct experiments, I randomly 
determine whether the village will have male session or female session. I follow the same 
procedure for both matrilineal and patrilineal villages. I invite the entire village, but only 
recruit one person per household, either male or female depending on the session. 
Subjects do not know the nature of the experiment till they participate. After the trust 
game, the subjects fill out a questionnaire for which they are paid. The questionnaire 
collects information about their individual characteristics. Table 3.1 summarizes some of 
the most relevant individual characteristics for each society separately. My average 
subject is 29 years old, have little over seven years of education and has about six 
household members. Two important individual level characteristics are religion and 
caste. Table 3.1 shows that at least 96% of both societies are either Christians or follow 
their indigenous tribal religion, while the figure for the Khasi community is 100%. Also, 
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at least 97% of both societies are schedule tribes which refer to disadvantaged indigenous 
people in the Indian caste system. About 57% of the males in my sample are the decision 
makers in their households while only 15% of females are the same. This gender gap is 
significant in both societies, although the percentage of women decision maker among 
Khasis (22%) are much more compared to Karbis (8%).  55% of Khasis and 14% of Karbis 
live in temporary dwellings which are non-permanent constructions (Kutcha house) such 
as mud houses. 58% of the Khasis have a bank account, while 82% of Karbis have a bank 
account. In both societies, the proportion of women holding bank accounts is significantly 
higher than men. 13% of Khasis and 56% of Karbis belong to a microfinance or other 
similar borrowing group; again the corresponding figures are significantly higher for 
women than men in both the societies.  Finally, I analyze a set of subjective and 
hypothetical questions on trust and cooperation behavior among the subjects. The first 
two questions provide the subjects with a statement and five options ranging from 
‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree.' The first statement is “I trust other people,” and the 
second statement is “I feel that most people can be trusted.” 49% of men and 72% of 
women have stated either ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ with the first statement. This gender 
gap is significant among the Karbis but not among the Khasis. For the third trust question, 
the subjects had to write down the first names of their five close friends, and then they 
were asked how many of these five friends do they trust enough to lend money. I find that 
in the Khasis society, men trust more than women on average while in the Karbi society 
women trust more than men. Like the trust questions, the cooperation questions 
contained the following statements, “I like to cooperate with other people” and “I think 
that most of the time people try to cooperate with other people.” For the first statement, 
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more men have stated either ‘strongly agree’ or ‘agree’ in the Khasi society while more 
women have done the same in the Karbi society. For the second statement, women from 
both societies have ‘agreed’ more than their male counterparts. The final question asked 
if the respondents think that in their community, everybody bonds together to solve 
problems or they solve their problems individually. Khasi men answered that they believe 
that the community cooperates to solve problems significantly more than Khasi women, 
while Karbi women stated the same, significantly more than Karbi men. Thus, these 
differences in observable characteristics of gender, both intra and intersociety, highlight 
that it is important to control for these factors when analyzing the data.
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Table 3.1: Summary of individual level characteristics of subjects by gender and society 
Individual  Overall Khasi Karbi 
characteristics Poole
d 
Male Female Diff Pooled Male Female Diff. Pooled Male Female Diff. 
             
Age 29.64 
(9.89) 
28.97 
(9.79) 
30.31 
(10) 
-1.34 29.52 
(9.54) 
30.68 
(10.96) 
28.34 
(7.88) 
2.34 29.75 
(10.26) 
27.44 
(8.49) 
32.06 
(11.42) 
-4.61* 
Education years 7.70 
(4.15) 
8.07 
(4.09) 
7.32 
(4.21) 
0.75 6.34 
(4.02) 
5.31 
(3.93) 
7.38 
(3.9) 
-2.06** 8.9 
(3.91) 
10.53 
(2.27) 
7.23 
(4.51) 
3.25*** 
Farmer 0.54 
(0.50) 
0.57 
(0.49) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.74 0.56 
(0.50) 
0.66 
(0.48) 
0.47 
(0.51) 
0.19 0.51 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.51) 
0.53 
(0.51) 
-0.3 
Tribal religion 0.14 
(0.38) 
0.12 
(0.32) 
0.12 
(0.37) 
-0.04 0.03 
(0.18) 
0.06 
(0.25) 
0 
(0) 
0.06 0.24 
(0.43) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.31 
(0.47) 
-0.14 
Christian 0.84 
(0.37) 
0.84 
(0.37 
0.84 
(0.37) 
0 0.97 
(0.17) 
0.94 
(0.25) 
1 
(0) 
-0.06 0.72 
(0.45) 
0.75 
(0.44) 
0.69 
(0.47) 
0.06 
Schedule tribe 0.97 
(0.17) 
0.97 
(0.17) 
0.97 
(0.17) 
0 0.94 
(0.24) 
0.94 
(0.25) 
0.94 
(0.25) 
0 1 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
1 
(0) 
0 
Ever married 0.73 
(0.47) 
0.57 
(0.50) 
0.88 
(0.32) 
-0.31*** 0.83 
(0.38) 
0.75 
(0.44) 
0.91 
(0.30) 
-0.15 0.64 
(0.48) 
0.42 
(0.50) 
0.86 
(0.35) 
-0.44*** 
I am decision maker 0.36 
(0.48) 
0.57 
(0.50) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
0.43*** 0.48 
(0.50) 
0.75 
(0.44) 
0.22 
(0.42) 
0.53*** 0.25 
(0.44) 
0.42 
(0.50) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
0.33*** 
Household members 
 
5.92 
(2.34) 
6.06 
(2.23) 
5.78 
(2.45) 
0.28 6.08 
(2.51) 
6.06 
(2.41) 
6.09 
(2.64) 
-0.31 5.78 
(2.18) 
6.06 
(2.08) 
5.50 
(2.27) 
0.56 
Lives in temporary 
dwellings 
0.33 
(0.47) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.34 
(0.48) 
-0.01 0.55 
(0.50) 
0.56 
(0.50) 
0.53 
(0.51) 
0.03 0.14 
(0.39) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
-0.06 
Holds a bank account 0.71 
(0.46) 
0.53 
(0.50) 
0.88 
(0.32) 
-0.35*** 0.58 
(0.50) 
0.31 
(0.47) 
0.84 
(0.37) 
-0.53*** 0.82 
(0.38) 
0.72 
(0.45) 
0.92 
(0.28) 
-0.19** 
Loan-group member 0.35 
(0.48) 
0.18 
(0.38) 
0.53 
(0.50) 
-0.35*** 0.13 
(0.33) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.22 
(0.42) 
-0.19** 0.56 
(0.50) 
0.31 
(0.48) 
0.81 
(0.40) 
-0.50*** 
I am trusting 0.60 
(0.49) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.72 
(0.45) 
-0.24*** 0.58 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.51) 
0.66 
(0.48) 
-0.16 0.63 
(0.49) 
0.47 
(0.51) 
0.78 
(0.42) 
-0.31*** 
Most people can be 
trusted 
0.65 
(0.48) 
0.65 
(0.48) 
0.65 
(0.48) 
0 0.59 
(0.50) 
0.66 
(0.48) 
0.53 
(0.51) 
0.12 0.69 
(0.46) 
0.64 
(0.49) 
0.75 
(0.44) 
-0.11 
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No. of friends I trust 3.88 
(2.14) 
3.85 
(2.13) 
3.91 
(2.16) 
-0.06 3.34 
(2.06) 
3.38 
(2.16) 
3.31 
(1.99) 
0.06 4.37 
(2.1) 
4.29 
(2.08) 
4.44 
(2.18) 
-0.16 
I am cooperating 0.81 
(0.39) 
0.81 
(0.39) 
0.81 
(0.39) 
0 0.94 
(0.24) 
0.97 
(0.18) 
0.91 
(0.30) 
0.06 0.69 
(0.46) 
0.67 
(0.48) 
0.72 
(0.45) 
-0.06 
Most people cooperate 0.69 
(0.46) 
0.66 
(0.48) 
0.72 
(0.45) 
-0.06 0.72 
(0.45) 
0.69 
(0.47) 
0.75 
(0.44) 
-0.06 0.67 
(0.47) 
0.64 
(0.49) 
0.69 
(0.47) 
-0.06 
My community is 
cooperating 
0.92 
(0.27) 
0.94 
(0.24) 
0.90 
(0.31) 
0.04 0.88 
(0.33) 
0.97 
(0.18) 
0.78 
(0.42) 
0.19** 0.96 
(0.20) 
0.92 
(0.28) 
1 
(0) 
-0.08* 
N 136 68 68  64 32 32  72 36 36  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.2.2.  Investment Game 
I implement the investment game developed by Berg et al. (1995) and later used 
by several other authors such as Cox (2004), Alpizar and Buck (2006). In this game, a 
first mover (FM) is randomly matched with an anonymous second mover (SM) of the 
same gender, each with an initial endowment of 200 rupees (the currency of India). The 
FM may choose to pass any amount of her endowment (0-200 rupees) in increments of 
20 rupees to the SM.  Any amount transferred by FM is multiplied by 3 by the 
experimenter and is given to the SM. The SM then can return in increments of 20 rupees, 
any amount from the tripled amount of what she received from the FM. The 20 rupees’ 
unit of divisibility is chosen so that the feasible set of actions for the subjects is same as 
that in Berg et al. (1995) and Cox (2004).   
Assuming self-regarding preferences, the Nash equilibrium prediction of this one-
shot game is that SM will keep the entire tripled amount transferred by the FM. From 
backward induction, the FM identifies this strategy of the SM and so, FM will not transfer 
any positive amount. Thus, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium allocation is (200,200) 
for the FM and the SM.  However, there is ample evidence, in both laboratory and field 
experiments, suggesting that a considerable proportion of subjects’ do not play per this 
Nash prediction.  A significant percentage of FMs send positive amounts to their 
anonymously paired SMs (Berg et al., 1995; Cox, 2004; Alpizar and Buck, 2006; Di 
Bartolomeo, G. & Papa, 2016). This deviation from the prediction of the standard non-
cooperative game theory is often attributed to trust (although we cannot rule out other 
motivations such as unconditional altruism).  
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3.2.3 Investment Risk Task 
A large body of work on trust asserts that the willingness to trust is closely 
associated with the willingness to take risk (Karlan, 2005; Alpizar and Buck, 2006; Fehr, 
2009).  This is because in an investment game the FM makes a trade-off between a sure-
thing (endowment) and an expected benefit that is contingent on how the SM responds.  
So, the FM takes a risk by trusting SM (Cook and Cooper, 2003). The decision by FM 
whether to trust SM can be viewed as similar to placing a risky bet on the trustworthiness 
of an anonymous counterpart in a situation where both can gain from reciprocal exchange 
(Eckel and Wilson 2004a). McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003) explains that FM and SM 
are reciprocal-trust related if: (i) there are possibility of mutual gains  from their joint 
actions, (ii) FM takes a risk by trusting SM, and (iii) SM gives up something in order to 
reciprocate FM’s trust.  Ben-Ner and Putterman (2001) points out that the determinants 
of trusting behavior of a subject include “her willingness to bear risk” and that “greater 
risk aversion leads to less trusting.” Karlan (2005) delineates that experimental trust 
measures are associated with risk behavior in a field experiment. 
Since trust and risk are closely related, I implement a simple investment risk (IR) 
task to control for risk attitudes. All subjects in the experiment earn endowment of Rs. 50 
for filling up a questionnaire. In the IR task, the subjects choose what portion of their 
earned endowment to invest in a risky lottery. The lottery returns three times the amount 
invested with a 50 percent chance and nothing otherwise. It is equivalent to choosing 
which lottery to play out from a set of ordered lotteries presented to the subject that 
increases linearly in expected payoff and standard deviation. The standard deviation 
associated with each lottery measures the risk of that lottery. Given this parameter, a risk 
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neutral (or risk-seeking) subject should invest the entire endowment. I show the CRRA 
range of the subjects based on the following CRRA specification: 𝑈(𝑥)  =  
𝑥1−𝑟
1−𝑟
  ,    when r ≠ 
1 and log (x) when r = 1; where r is the relative risk aversion parameter.     
Table 3.2: Investment risk lotteries with CRRA calculations 
Lottery 
number 
Proportion of earned 
endowment invested 
High 
payoff  
Low 
payoff  
Expected 
value 
Standard 
deviation  
CRRA Range 
       
1 0 
 
50 50 50 
 
0 2.49 < r 
2 0.2 70 40 55 15 0.84 < r < 2.49 
       
3 0.4 90 30 60 30 0.5 < r < 0.84 
       
4 0.6 110 20 65 45 0.33 < r < 0.5 
       
5 0.8 130 10 70 60 0.18 < r < 0.33 
       
6 1 150 0 75 75 r < 0.18 
       
 
3.2.4 Experimental Procedures 
Each experimental session is a single gender session, either male or female, to 
make the gender identity of the participants salient. When the participants arrive, they 
are given consent forms. If more participants come than required, they are made to draw 
chits to randomize who will participate and who will not. The participants who draw a 
numbered chit gets to participate while those who draw blank chits are only paid the 
show-up fee. The subjects who draw a chit with odd number play the game as an FM, 
while those who draw a chit with even number play as SM. Thus, the sorting into FM and 
SM is done randomly. Before the game begins, subject instructions are read in both 
English and the local language (Khasi/Karbi). Then, players are separated into two 
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waiting rooms for FM and SM, from which each player is called into a private room one 
by one. In the private room, the experimenter reviews the game task and answers any 
questions the subject may have about the game. The experimenter then exits the room 
and closes the door so that the subject can make her decision in complete privacy.  
Each subject is given ten 20-rupees bills in a brown envelope. An FM privately 
decides whether to keep all ten bills or give some or all of them to the anonymously paired 
SM by moving them from her brown envelope to an empty white envelope. After deciding, 
the FM drops the white envelope in a box and keeps the brown envelope with her. For 
each 20-rupee bill transferred to the white envelope, the experimenter adds two more 20-
rupee bills to triple the amount transferred. The paired SM receives the white envelope 
containing the tripled amount and decides privately how much of the tripled amount to 
keep by moving the 20-rupee bills from the white envelope to the brown envelope 
containing her endowment. She does not show what is the total amount inside her brown 
envelope to anyone else, including the experimenter. The amount that the SM leaves in 
the white envelope is sealed and returned to the paired FM in private. A local research 
assistant is hired who is not involved during any part of the experiment except for the task 
of returning the envelope to the FM. The experimenter is not present when the white 
envelope is given to the FM. The subjects are informed about this procedure of payment 
in advance. This particular procedure is followed to implement as closely as possible, a 
‘double blind’ payoff, given the practical constraints of a field experiment.  
Each subject participates in the investment game only once. After playing the 
game, the participants fill out a questionnaire for which they are paid 50 rupees. Subjects 
do not write their names on the questionnaires. The questionnaire includes basic 
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demographic and individual level information as well as subjective questions about trust 
and trustworthy behavior, as discussed in Section 3.1. Finally, when the subjects are paid 
the 50 rupees for the questionnaire, they are invited to participate in the IR task. The 
subjects are not informed about the IR task prior to this final stage of payment. The 
subjects are told that they can keep the entire 50 rupees or they can choose to invest all 
or part of it (in multiples of ten) in a risky lottery. Thus, their choice set in the IR task is 
represented by C= {0,10,20,30,40,50}. The lottery returns three times the amount 
invested with a 50 percent chance and nothing otherwise. Each subject is presented with 
a bucket containing three white and three colored balls. All the balls are identical in size, 
shape, and weight. Each subject is then asked in private to place her bet and draw a ball 
from the bucket without looking inside it. If she draws a colored ball, she receives three 
times her bet. However, if she draws a white ball the amount of her bet is deducted from 
her 50 rupees. This method of using a visual representation of probability using an equal 
number of white and colored balls is chosen due to its relative simplicity in 
communicating the concept of probability to a semi-literate subject.  
 
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Descriptive Analysis 
I start by looking at the gender difference in the pooled sample and then separately 
for each society. Column 1 of Table 3.3 shows the difference in means. Column 2 shows 
the p-values using simple two-sample t-tests. However, I have multiple outcomes and 
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subgroups on which I want to conduct hypothesis testing, but the simple t-test does not 
account for it. Thus, column 3 reports multiplicity-adjusted p-values computed using 
Theorem 3.1 of List et al. (2016). Column 4 and 5 report p-values from the non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests to look at the difference between 
the underlying distributions of the samples. Figure 3.1 shows that for the pooled sample, 
the mean amount sent by males is 58.24 while the amount sent by females is 40. The 
mean amount returned by males (84.62) is also higher than the corresponding amount 
for females (64.52). However, this gender gap is not statistically significant, especially in 
the multiplicity adjusted mean test. Figure 3.2 shows that in the pooled sample, the mean 
amount sent and returned by the matrilineal Khasis are much higher than that by 
patrilineal Karbis. The difference in the amount sent by FM is significant at p < 0.01 level 
in the simple and multiplicity adjusted mean test as well as Mann-Whitney test and K-S 
test. Next, I partition the sample based on the societies as depicted in Figure 3.3. I find 
that in the patrilineal Karbi society, the mean amount sent and received by women is 
higher whereas, in the matrilineal Khasi society, the mean amount sent and received by 
men is higher.  Figure 3.4 and 3.5 shows the amounts sent and returned by subject pairs 
in the Karbi and Khasi sample. As depicted in Table 3.3, I find that the gender gap in the 
Karbi society is not significant. However, the gender gap in the Khasi society is significant 
in all tests for amount sent and in Mann-Whitney and K-S test for amount returned.  
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Figure 3.1: Mean Amounts Sent and Returned: Pooled Male vs. Female  
 
                                              
Figure 3.2: Percent Sent and Returned: Pooled Male vs. Female 
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Figure 3.3: Percent Sent and Returned: Pooled Khasi vs. Karbi 
                                     
Figure 3.4: Percent Sent and Returned: Matrilineal Khasi vs. Patrilineal Karbi 
15%
44%
35%
44%
Patrilineal Karbi Matrilineal Khasi
Percent Sent and Returned
Percent of endowment sent by FM Return percent by SM
12%
33%
18%
51%
48%
39%
23%
48%
Patrilineal Karbi Matrilineal Khasi
Male Female Male Female
Percent Sent and Returned
Percent of endowment sent by FM Return percent by SM
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Figure 3.5: Amounts Sent and Returned by Subject Pairs in the Patrilineal Sample 
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Figure 3.6: Amounts Sent and Returned by Subject Pairs in the Matrilineal Sample 
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Table 3.3: Parametric and non-parametric test for outcome variables for Khasi and Karbi 
sample 
  p-values 
Outcome Variables Difference 
in Means 
Simple 
Means 
test 
Multiplicity 
Adj. 
Mann-
Whitney  
K-S  
test  
Amount Sent by FM      
Pooled male vs. female 18.24 0.09* 0.18 0.12 0.19 
Pooled Khasi vs. Karbi 49.12 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.03** 
Khasi male vs. female 51.25 0.00*** 0.03** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Karbi male vs. female -11.11 0.25 0.46 0.22 0.49 
      
Amount Returned by SM      
Pooled male vs. female 20.10 0.26 0.23 0.08* 0.05* 
Pooled Khasi vs. Karbi 34.35 0.05* 0.08* 0.03** 0.18 
Khasi male vs. female 40 0.12 0.46 0.01** 0.04** 
Karbi male vs. female -14 0.53 0.61 0.91 0.97 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Table 3.4 shows result for the outcome variable Amount sent by FM, using linear 
regression framework. Column 1 shows the result of a parsimonious specification where 
the amount sent is regressed on a dummy for female (female=1, male=0) and a dummy 
for matrilineal Khasi (matrilineal Khasi=1, patrilineal Karbi=0). Column 2 adds a dummy 
for the interaction of female and matrilineal Khasi. In Column 3, I control for individual-
level characteristics such as age, years of education, whether the subject is a farmer, 
Christian, belongs to schedule tribe, married, number of household members, is the 
decision maker in the family, lives in a permanent or temporary dwelling, holds a bank 
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account and is a member of a borrowing group.  Column 4 is the full model where in 
addition to the individual level characteristics, I also control for a set of subjective 
responses to questions on trust and cooperation behavior among the subjects. These 
questions record the subjects’ response to the following set of statements, “I trust other 
people,” “I feel that most people can be trusted,” “I like to cooperate with other people,” 
and “I think that most of the time people try to cooperate with other people.” The final 
set of questions recorded how many of their close friends do the subjects trust enough to 
give a loan and if they think that in their community, everybody bonds together to solve 
problems or they solve their problems individually. For all the four models, the standard 
errors are clustered at the group level, where a group is defined as a subject pair of FM 
and SM. Controlling for individual characteristics, I find that no significant gender gap 
exists among the FM males and females in the pooled sample. I do, however, find a 
significant difference between the two societies. The coefficient estimates from column 4 
show that the matrilineal Khasi FMs send 58 rupees (i.e., about three 20-rupee bills) more 
on average than the patrilineal Karbi FMs. Row 3 of Table 3.4 reports the coefficient for 
the interaction term of female and matrilineal Khasi. The coefficient estimates suggest 
that matrilineal Khasi women on average send 66 (i.e., about three 20-rupee bills) rupees 
less than patrilineal Karbi women, compared to their male counterparts, even after 
controlling for observable characteristics and responses to trust questions. This finding is 
significant at p < 0.01 level. None of the individual controls except caste of the subject is 
statistically significant. Moreover, responses to none of the trust or cooperation questions 
significantly predict behavior in the experiment.  
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Since the FM can transfer none, all, or part of her endowment of 200 rupees, the 
data are censored on the left at zero and on the right at 200, by the experimental design. 
Thus, the simple linear regression model of Table 3.4 may not be the most appropriate 
model to analyze this type of censored data. In Table 3.5, I report results from a left- and 
right-censored Tobit model at zero and 200. I follow the same approach of starting with 
the most parsimonious specification in column 1 and then adding interaction terms, 
controls and the full model in column 4. The standard errors are clustered at the group 
level and are adjusted to correct for heteroskedasticity. The results from the Tobit 
estimation are similar to the linear regression model in sign and significance, although 
the coefficient estimates are lower in the Tobit model. Like the OLS model, I do not find 
any significant gender difference in the pooled sample. The marginal coefficient estimates 
show that the matrilineal Khasi FMs send 44 rupees (i.e., about two 20-rupee bills) more 
on average than the patrilineal Karbi FMs. This finding is significant at p < 0.01 level. 
Finally, the coefficient of the interaction term is also significant at p < 0.01 level even after 
controlling for observable characteristics and responses to trust questions. The coefficient 
suggests that the matrilineal Khasi women on average send 48 (i.e., about two and a half 
20-rupee bills) rupees less than patrilineal Karbi women, compared to their male 
counterparts. Based on these findings, I can formulate my first set of results. 
RESULT 1.1: Matrilineal FMs are more trusting than patrilineal FMs on average.  
RESULT 1.2: Women in matrilineal society are less trusting than patrilineal women, 
compared to their male counterparts.  
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Table 3.4: Linear regression results for outcome variable: Amount sent by FM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Amount sent by FM OLS OLS OLS OLS 
     
Female -18.24* 11.11 33.38 26.16 
 (9.34) (9.46) (23.38) (25.36) 
Matrilineal Khasi 40.63*** 71.81*** 59.88*** 57.67*** 
 (9.53) (11.45) (16.78) (18.31) 
Female* Matrilineal Khasi __ -62.36*** -61.62*** -66.70*** 
  (17.54) (18.76) (21.39) 
Individual controls No No Yes Yes 
Trust and cooperation controls No No No Yes 
Observations 68 68 68 68 
R-squared 0.26 0.39 0.51 0.57 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 3.5: Tobit estimation results for outcome variable: Amount sent by FM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Amount sent by FM Tobit+ Tobit+ Tobit+ Tobit+ 
     
Female -8.96 12.58 32.47* 26.08 
 (7.40) (8.59) (16.52) (16.64) 
Matrilineal Khasi 30.89*** 53.70*** 45.25*** 44.67*** 
 (6.20) (8.01) (10.69) (11.49) 
Female* Matrilineal Khasi __ -44.89*** -43.80*** -47.99*** 
  (13.23) (13.22) (14.08) 
Individual controls No No Yes Yes 
Trust and cooperation controls No No No Yes 
Left-censored observations 11 11 11 11 
Right-censored observation 1 1 1 1 
Uncensored observations 56 56 56 56 
Total observations 68 68 68 68 
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.09 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Next, I analyze the behavior of the SMs. Table 3.6 shows result using linear 
regression framework. I begin with a parsimonious specification where the amount 
returned by SM is regressed on a dummy for female, a dummy for matrilineal Khasi and 
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the amount received by the SM, which is the triple of the amount sent by the paired FM. 
Then I add the interaction terms, followed by the individual level controls and the 
response to trust and cooperation questions. The control variables are same as the ones 
described for the FMs. I find that the amount returned by females are higher on average, 
but this gender gap is not significant in the full model (column 4). The matrilineal Khasi 
SMs also return more on average, but this is also not significant. However, I find that the 
amount received by the SM is a significant predictor of the amount returned by her. For 
each additional rupee received, the SM returns 0.60 rupees to the FMs. It implies that for 
each additional 20-rupee bill sent by the FM, the SM receives 60 rupees and returns 36 
rupees on average. Thus, for each additional 20-rupee bill transferred from the FM to SM, 
the FM earns a net of 16 rupees while the SM earns a net of 24 rupees on average. I find 
that Khasi women return 106 rupees (about five 20 rupee bills) less than Karbi women, 
compared to their male counterparts, although it is not significant. However, the 
interaction term of Khasi women with the amount received is significant at p<0.1 level. I 
also find that none of the individual controls or responses to the trust or cooperation 
questions significantly predicts behavior in the experiment.  
Similar to the FM data, the SM data is also left and right censored by the 
experimental design. Since the SMs can return none of the amount received, the data for 
all SM are left censored at zero.  Also, since the SMs can return up to the tripled amount 
of what the corresponding FMs sends, the data are right censored at the amount received 
by the SMs, that is, the tripled amount of what the corresponding FMs sends. It is 
important to note that the right censoring values can change from one SM to another as 
the amount sent by their matched FM varies. So it is not appropriate to analyze the data 
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using a  Tobit model with censoring at fixed values like in the FM data analysis. Instead, 
I use a censored normal regression, in which the censoring values may change from 
observation to observation. I create a variable indicating if the amount returned by SM is 
censored and, if so, whether the censoring is left or right.  Zero indicates that amount 
returned by SM is not censored, while -1 indicates that amount returned by SM is left 
censored at zero and +1 indicates that it is right censored at the tripled amount of what 
the corresponding FMs sends. I find that 6 observations are left censored, and another 6 
are right censored, while 45 observations are uncensored. I use the same approach of 
starting with parsimonious specification and adding controls. The standard errors are 
clustered at the group level and are adjusted to correct for heteroskedasticity. The results 
from the censored normal regression are similar to the linear regression model. However, 
here I find that gender and society are weakly significant. I find that the SM returns about 
64% of the tripled amount received from the FM. This finding is significant at p < 0.05 
level. I also find evidence of heterogeneity across the societies. Khasi women return 153 
rupees (about seven and a half 20-rupee bills) less than Karbi women, compared to their 
male counterparts. This finding is significant at p < 0.05 level, while the interaction term 
of Khasi women with the amount returned is also significant at p<0.05 level. Based on 
these findings, I can formulate my next set of results. 
RESULT 2.1: The amount returned by the SMs significantly increase in the amount 
they receive from the FMs.  
RESULT 2.2: Matrilineal SMs are weakly more trustworthy than patrilineal SMs on 
average.  
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RESULT 2.3: Women in matrilineal society show less trustworthiness than patrilineal 
women, compared to their male counterparts.  
 
Table 3.6: Linear regression results for amount returned by SM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Amount returned by SM OLS OLS OLS OLS 
     
Female 20.77 38.16 81.38* 99.00 
 (12.74) (23.86) (46.51) (61.52) 
Matrilineal Khasi 1.87 47.91 40.36 55.07 
 (12.75) (44.91) (57.54) (58.73) 
Amount received by SM 0.42*** 0.54*** 0.50** 0.61** 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.25) (0.29) 
Female*Khasi __ -64.18 -93.72 -107.3 
  (49.81) (65.96) (70.05) 
Female*Amount received __ -0.17 -0.22 -0.39 
  (0.24) (0.26) (0.32) 
Khasi*Amount received __ -0.24 -0.24 -0.36 
  (0.21) (0.24) (0.25) 
Female*Khasi*Amount received __ 0.41 0.49 0.68** 
  (0.30) (0.31) (0.34) 
Individual controls No No Yes Yes 
Trust and cooperation controls No No No Yes 
Observations 57 57 57 57 
R-squared 0.55 0.58 0.67 0.69 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 3.7: Censored normal regression results for amount returned by SM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Amount returned by SM Cens. Reg Cens. Reg Cens. Reg Cens. Reg 
     
Female 27.36* 82.99* 122.2** 127.3* 
 (15.52) (46.20) (58.76) (70.01) 
Matrilineal Khasi 2.07 84.21 73.40 94.34* 
 (16.29) (52.20) (54.38) (49.81) 
Amount received by SM 0.44*** 0.74*** 0.61** 0.64** 
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 (0.08) (0.20) (0.27) (0.29) 
Female* Matrilineal Khasi __ -109* -145.40** -153.40** 
  (62.25) (67.37) (64.38) 
Female*Amount received __ -0.40 -0.38 -0.47 
  (0.31) (0.29) (0.33) 
Khasi*Amount received __ -0.44* -0.35 -0.39* 
  (0.26) (0.25) (0.23) 
Female*Khasi*Amount received __ 0.64* 0.66** 0.77** 
  (0.35) (0.31) (0.31) 
Individual controls No No Yes Yes 
Trust and cooperation controls No No No Yes 
Left-censored observations 6 6 6 6 
Right-censored observation 6 6 6 6 
Uncensored observations 45 45 45 45 
Total observations 57 57 57 57 
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.10 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Investment Risk Analysis 
Does variation in risk behavior explain the gender difference in trust and 
trustworthiness among the matrilineal and patrilineal societies? To answer this 
question, I start by describing the variation in risk behavior across the societies. Figure 
3.6 delineates the proportion of earned endowment invested in the risky lottery by males 
and females of both societies. I take this measure as a proxy for the degree of risk aversion 
for the subjects. In the Khasi society, there is a slight gender difference in average 
investment, but it is not significant. However, in the Karbi sample, there is a significant 
gender gap in investment. Karbi men invest 82 percent while women invest only 42 
percent. It indicates that matrilineal women have similar risk attitude as matrilineal men 
on average. On the other hand, patrilineal women are significantly more risk averse than 
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men on average. Figure 3.6 also shows that patrilineal women are substantially more risk-
averse than matrilineal women. These findings are consistent with that of Gong and Yang 
(2012) who observe that the gender gap in risk aversion is smaller among the matrilineal 
Mosuo society than among the neighboring patrilineal Yi society in China.  
 
                             
Figure 3.7: Mean Percentage of Endowment Invested in the Risky Lottery: Khasi vs. Karbi 
 
Table 3.8 shows results for the amounts sent by FM including risk measure in a 
Tobit model which is left-censored at zero and right-censored at 200. Column 1 shows the 
results when amount sent is regressed on a dummy for female, a matrilineal dummy and 
investment risk. Column 2 adds the interaction of female and matrilineal. Column 3 adds 
82%
42%
74%
68%
Patrilineal Karbi Matrilineal Khasi
Investment in Risky Lottery
Male Female
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the individual characteristics, and column 4 is the full model which includes, in addition 
to column 3, the control for the responses from the trust and cooperation questions. In 
column 1, the coefficient for investment risk shows that the FMs who invest 10 rupees 
more in the risky lottery send about 30 rupees more on average to their anonymously 
paired SM. This finding is significant at p<0.05 level and is consistent with the notion 
that “greater risk aversion leads to less trusting” (Ben-Ner and Putterman 2001). 
However, as I add the interaction terms and the controls in column 2, 3 and 4, I find that 
the coefficient for investment risk, although positive, is no longer significant. In the full 
model (column 4), I find that the marginal coefficient for the matrilineal Khasi FMs is 
43.29 and that for the coefficient of the interaction term is -40.18. Both the coefficients 
are significant at p < 0.01 level, suggesting that the matrilineal Khasi FMs send 
significantly more on average, but the Khasi women send less on average than patrilineal 
Karbi women, compared to their male counterparts. This finding is similar, in sign and 
significance, to the one obtained from the full model in Table 3.5, where I do not control 
for risk behavior. Even the coefficient estimates between the two models are close to each 
other (43.29 versus 44.67 for matrilineal Khasi and -40.18 versus -47.99 for the 
interaction of female and matrilineal). Finally, in all the models of Table 3.8, I find that 
the coefficient for investment risk is positive which reaffirms the general conjecture in the 
literature that willingness to take risk is associated with higher trust. However, like Eckel 
and Wilson (2004), I do not find any significant correlation between trust and measures 
of risk when I control for other factors.  
Table 3.9 delineates the results for the amount returned by SM including risk 
measure in a censored normal regression which is left-censored at zero and right-
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censored at the amount received by each SM, that is, tripled amount of what the 
corresponding FM sends. Like before, I start with the parsimonious specification where I 
regress the amount returned on a dummy for female, a matrilineal dummy, the amount 
received by SM and investment risk. Then I add the interaction terms and the individual 
characteristics and finally the responses from the trust and cooperation questions in the 
full model. The coefficient for investment risk is positive but not significant. The other 
coefficient estimates are very similar, in sign, significance, and magnitude, to the one 
obtained from the full model in Table 3.6, where I do not control for risk behavior. 
Controlling for risk measures in the full model of Table 3.9, I find that the coefficient for 
the amount received by SM is almost the same as the one obtained from the full model in 
Table 3.6, although it is now significant only at p<0.1 level. The coefficient estimates for 
the interaction of matrilineal and female is -144.8 and is significant at p<0.10 level. Thus, 
I find that controlling for risk does not significantly change the results for both the FM 
and the SM. This brings me to my final set of results. 
RESULT 3.1: Lower risk aversion is positively correlated with higher trust, but the 
relationship is not significant when controlled for other observables.  
RESULT 3.2: Risk aversion is not correlated with trustworthiness.  
RESULT 3.3: Variation in risk behavior does not explain the gender difference in trust 
and trustworthiness among the matrilineal and patrilineal societies 
 
 
 
 
 135 
 
Table 3.8: Result for amount sent by FM controlling for investment risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Amount sent by FM Tobit+ Tobit+ Tobit+ Tobit+ 
     
Female -4.16 12.53 26.90* 20.80 
 (8.15) (8.49) (16.19) (16.78) 
Matrilineal Khasi 34.21*** 52.48*** 44.27*** 43.29*** 
 (6.41) (8.25) (10.60) (11.44) 
Investment Risk 30.25** 20.88 18.47 16.24 
 (12.73) (14.23) (12.16) (11.26) 
Female* Matrilineal Khasi __ -37.96** -36.15*** -40.18*** 
  (14.77) (13.78) (14.65) 
Individual controls No No Yes Yes 
Trust and cooperation controls No No No Yes 
Observations 68 68 68 68 
R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
+ Marginal coefficients        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 3.9: Result for amount returned by SM controlling for investment risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Amount returned by SM Cens. Reg Cens. Reg Cens. Reg Cens. Reg 
     
Female 39.17** 98.57** 124.40** 125.40* 
 (18.11) (46.63) (60.92) (70.50) 
Matrilineal Khasi 6.54 78.81 66.76 89.99 
 (16.62) (52.77) (59.56) (57.05) 
Amount received by SM 0.43*** 0.76*** 0.61** 0.62* 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.27) (0.31) 
Investment Risk 38.46 39.69 16.92 12.87 
 (29.03) (33.05) (41.40) (52.10) 
Female* Matrilineal Khasi __ -98.58 -134.4* -144.8* 
  (61.3) (72.78) (72.35) 
Female*Amount received __ -0.47 -0.40 -0.47 
  (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) 
Khasi*Amount received __ -0.44* -0.34 -0.38 
  (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) 
Female*Khasi*Amount received __ 0.67* 0.68** 0.79** 
  (0.36) (0.34) (0.32) 
Individual controls No No Yes Yes 
Trust and cooperation controls No No No Yes 
Left-censored observations 6 6 6 6 
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Right-censored observation 6 6 6 6 
Uncensored observations 45 45 45 45 
Total observations 57 57 57 57 
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.10 
Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter studies the inﬂuence of social context and norms on gender difference 
in trust and trustworthiness by exploiting the variation in social norms and gender roles 
across comparable matrilineal and patrilineal societies in India. I find that, while 
matrilineal subjects are more trusting and more trustworthy on average, there is 
significant evidence of heterogeneity in gender difference between the two societies. 
Matrilineal women are less trusting as well as less trustworthy than patrilineal women, 
compared to their male counterparts, even after controlling for risk preference and other 
individual characteristics.  Based on these findings, I argue that societal structure and 
norms have important implications for the observed gender differences in trust and 
trustworthiness. Moreover, the fact that the Khasis and the Karbis are genetically closely 
related bolsters this conclusion.  
An important caveat to my findings concerns the measure of trust and 
trustworthiness in my investment game experiment. I measure trust by the amount sent 
by the FM and trustworthiness by the amount returned by the SM following Berg et al. 
(1995), Eckel and Wilson (2004a), Bellemare and Kroger (2007), Buchan et al. (2008) 
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and Schwieren and Sutter (2008). However, this measure confounds trust with other 
possible motivations such as unconditional altruism and risk preferences. While I 
implement an investment risk (IR) task to control for subject specific risk behavior, my 
design cannot distinguish between trust and unconditional altruism. This issue becomes 
more prominent when I analyze gender differences across societies. With my present 
design, it is not possible to distinguish whether matrilineal women are less trusting or less 
altruistic than patrilineal women. Cox (2004) implements a triadic design by adding the 
dictator control games to the investment game to distinguish conclusively between 
behaviors attributable to trust and unconditional altruism. Thus, a possible extension for 
future research is to extend the investment game framework following Cox (2004) by 
adding the FM and the SM dictator controls to answer whether gender differences 
between matrilineal and patrilineal societies are attributed to trust and reciprocal motives 
or other-regarding preferences.  
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Appendix A: Subject Instruction for Individual Game  
Thank you for participating in today’s experiment. It will take up to 4 hours to 
finish the experiment.  
No talking allowed until the end of the experiment. If anyone is found 
trying to communicate with other participants, she/he will be declared disqualified. A 
disqualified participant will not receive any payment for this game. If you have any 
questions, or if you do not understand any rules of the game, please raise your hand. You 
will be personally attended to.  
Privacy: All your decisions will be kept confidential, that is, no other 
participant will know about your decisions. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid 
in cash in private.  
How will the Game Progress? 
There will be two jars—jar A and jar B. Jar A will have five colored and one 
white ball in it. Jar B will have three colored and three white balls in it. You will be 
asked to choose one of the two jars and draw one ball from your chosen jar without looking 
inside.  
If you choose jar A and draw a colored ball from it, you will receive Rs. 60. If you 
choose jar B and draw a colored ball from it, you will receive Rs. 160. If you draw a white 
ball from either jar, you will not receive any money.  
If a colored ball is drawn, you will decide whether to contribute Rs. 25 from your 
winnings to the pot. If you do not contribute, the game will end.  
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The game will proceed to the second round only if you contribute. The second 
round will be played the same way. Remember that the money you receive in any round 
of this game cannot be used in subsequent rounds. 
How Long Will The Game Go On? 
             The game will have multiple rounds. The exact number of rounds will not be 
announced in advance. 
What will be Your Final Earnings from the Game? 
Your final earnings will be calculated by simply adding up your earnings in all the 
rounds in the game.  
What is the Chance of Drawing a Colored Ball from Jar A? 
There is a 5 out of 6 chance of drawing a colored ball from Jar A.  
What is the Chance of Drawing a Colored Ball from Jar B? 
There is a 50-50 chance of drawing a colored ball from Jar B. 
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Appendix B: Subject Instruction for Group Full Game 
Thank you for participating in today’s experiment. It will take up to 4 hours to 
finish the experiment.  
No talking allowed until the end of the experiment. If anyone is found 
trying to communicate with other participants, she/he will be declared disqualified. A 
disqualified participant will not receive any payment for this game. If you have any 
questions, or if you do not understand any rules of the game, please raise your hand. You 
will be personally attended to.  
Privacy: All your decisions will be kept confidential, that is, no other 
participant will know about your decisions. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid 
in cash in private.  
Random Matching and Anonymity: You will be randomly paired with 
another participant for the entire duration of the experiment. However, at no point during 
the experiment will you know the identity of your partner. Your partner will also never 
know your identity.  
How will the Game Progress? 
There will be two jars—jar A and jar B. Jar A will have five colored and one 
white ball in it. Jar B will have three colored and three white balls in it. You will be 
asked to choose one of the two jars and draw one ball from your chosen jar without looking 
inside.  
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If you choose jar A and draw a colored ball from it, you will receive Rs. 60. If you 
choose jar B and draw a colored ball from it, you will receive Rs. 160. If you draw a white 
ball from either jar, you will not receive any money.  
If you draw a colored ball, you will decide whether or not to contribute Rs. 50 from 
your winnings to the pot. Your partner will face the same task. If both of you 
contribute, then each of you will get Rs. 25 back from the experimenter. If only one 
of you contributes, then the contributing member will not get any money back from 
the experimenter. If both of you draw white balls or neither of you contributes, the game 
will end.  
The game will proceed to the second round only if at least one of you draw a colored 
ball and choose to contribute. The second round will be played the same way. 
Remember that the money you receive in any round of this game cannot be used in 
subsequent rounds. 
Will Your Partner Know if You Chose Jar A or Jar B? 
No. It will be your private information.  
Will Your Partner Know if You Choose to Contribute or Not? 
No. It will be your private information.  
How Long Will The Game Go On? 
The game will have multiple rounds. The exact number of rounds will not be 
announced in advance. 
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What will be Your Final Earnings from the Game? 
Your final earnings will be calculated by simply adding up your earnings in all the 
rounds in the game.  
What is the Chance of Drawing a Colored Ball from Jar A? 
There is a 5 out of 6 chance of drawing a colored ball from Jar A.  
What is the Chance of Drawing a Colored Ball from Jar B? 
There is a 50-50 chance of drawing a colored ball from Jar B. 
Under What Situations will Your Partner Not Contribute? 
Your partner will not contribute if she/he draws a white ball, or draws a colored 
ball and chooses not to contribute. 
Will You Know Whether Your Partner Has Drawn a White Or a Colored Ball? 
No. You will not know which colored ball your partner has drawn. Neither will 
your partner know which colored ball you have drawn. 
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Appendix C: Subject Instruction for Ex-ante Group Game 
Thank you for participating in today’s experiment. It will take up to 4 hours to 
finish the experiment.  
No talking allowed until the end of the experiment. If anyone is found 
trying to communicate with other participants, she/he will be declared disqualified. A 
disqualified participant will not receive any payment for this game. If you have any 
questions, or if you do not understand any rules of the game, please raise your hand. You 
will be personally attended to.  
Privacy: All your decisions will be kept confidential. No other participant 
will know about your decisions. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid in cash in 
private.  
Random Matching and Anonymity: You will be randomly paired with 
another participant for the entire duration of the experiment. However, at no point during 
the experiment will you know the identity of your partner. Your partner will also never 
know your identity.  
How will the Game Progress? 
There will be two jars—jar A and jar B. Jar A will have five colored and one white 
ball in it. Jar B will have three colored and three white balls in it. You will be asked to 
choose one of the two jars and draw one ball from your chosen jar without looking inside. 
If you choose jar A and draw a colored ball from it, you will receive Rs. 10. If you choose 
jar B and draw a colored ball from it, you will receive Rs. 110. If you draw a white ball 
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from either jar, you will not receive any money. Your partner will face the same task. If 
both of you draw colored balls from either jar, each of you will get an additional 
amount of Rs. 25 from the experimenter. If only one of you draw colored ball, then 
she/he will not get any additional money from the experimenter. If both of you draw white 
balls, the game will end.  
The game will proceed to the second round only if at least one of you draw a 
colored ball. The second round will be played the same way. Remember that the money 
you receive in any round of this game cannot be used in subsequent rounds. 
Will Your Partner Know if You Chose Jar A or Jar B? 
No. It will be your private information.  
How Long Will The Game Go On? 
The game will have multiple rounds. The exact number of rounds will not be 
announced in advance. 
What will be Your Final Earnings from the Game? 
Your final earnings will be calculated by simply adding up your earnings in all the 
rounds in the game.  
What is the Chance of Drawing a colored ball from Jar A? 
There is a 5 out of 6 chance of drawing a colored ball from Jar A.  
What is the Chance of Drawing a colored ball from Jar B? 
There is a 50-50 chance of drawing a colored ball from Jar B. 
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Appendix D: Subject Instruction for Ex-post Group Game 
Thank you for participating in today’s experiment. It will take up to 4 hours to 
finish the experiment.  
No talking allowed until the end of the experiment. If anyone is found 
trying to communicate with other participants, she/he will be declared disqualified. A 
disqualified participant will not receive any payment for this game. If you have any 
questions, or if you do not understand any rules of the game, please raise your hand. You 
will be personally attended to.  
Privacy: All your decisions will be kept confidential. No other participant 
will know about your decisions. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid in cash in 
private.  
Random Matching and Anonymity: You will be randomly paired with 
another participant for the entire duration of the experiment. However, at no point during 
the experiment will you know the identity of your partner. Your partner will also never 
know your identity.  
How will the Game Progress? 
There will be six balls in a jar—five colored and one white. You will be asked 
to draw one ball from the jar without looking inside. If you draw a colored ball, you will 
receive Rs. 60. If you draw a white ball, you will not receive any money.  
If a colored ball is drawn, you will decide whether to contribute Rs. 50 from your 
winnings to the pot. Your partner will face the same task. If both of you contribute, 
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then each of you will get Rs. 25 back from the experimenter. If only one of you 
contributes, then the contributing member will not get any money back from the 
experimenter. If neither of you contributes, the game will end.  
The game will proceed to the second round only if at least one of you contributes. 
The second round will be played the same way. Remember that the money you receive 
in any round of this game cannot be used in subsequent rounds. 
Will Your Partner Know if You Choose to Contribute or Not? 
No. It will be your private information.  
How Long Will The Game Go On? 
The game will have multiple rounds. The exact number of rounds will not be 
announced in advance. 
What will be Your Final Earnings from the Game? 
Your final earnings will be calculated by simply adding up your earnings in all the 
rounds in the game.  
Under What Situations will Your Partner Not Contribute? 
Your partner will not contribute if she/he draws a white ball, or draws a colored 
ball and chooses not to contribute. 
Will You Know Whether Your Partner Has Drawn a White Or a Colored Ball? 
No. You will not know which colored ball your partner has drawn. Neither will 
your partner know which colored ball you have drawn. 
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Appendix E: Type X Subject Instruction for Investment Game 
Thank you for participating in today’s experiment. It will take up to 4 hours to 
finish the experiment.  
No talking allowed until the end of the experiment. If anyone is found 
trying to communicate with other participants, she/he will be declared disqualified. A 
disqualified participant will not receive any payment for this game. If you have any 
questions, or if you do not understand any rules of the game, please raise your hand. You 
will be personally attended to.  
Privacy: All your decisions will be kept confidential. No other participant 
will know about your decisions. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid in private.  
Random Matching and Anonymity: You are a Type X individual in this 
experiment. You will be randomly matched with a Type Y participant for the 
experiment. However, at no point during the experiment will you know the identity of 
your partner. Your partner will also never know your identity.  
How will the Game Progress? 
Each Type X and Type Y participants will be handed a brown envelope containing 
10 notes of Rs. 20. Each of you Type X participants will also be given an empty white 
envelope. One by one you will go to an empty room and decide privately whether to keep 
all 10 notes or give some or all of them to your paired Type Y participant by moving them 
from the brown envelope to the white envelope. After you make your decision, you will 
drop the white envelope in a box and keep the brown envelope with you.  
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Every note that you transfer to the white envelope will be tripled by the 
experimenters. That is, the experimenter will add Rs. 40 for every Rs. 20 note that you 
transfer to your Type Y partner. After all the Type X people have made their decisions, the 
Type Y people will receive the white envelope containing the tripled amount. They will 
then go to the empty room one by one and decide privately whether to return some, all, 
or none of the tripled amounts to their respective Type X partner. 
What will be Your Final Earnings from the Game? 
Your final earnings will be the total of the amount returned by your Type Y partner 
and the amount remaining in your original brown envelope.  
What happens, if for example, you move zero note from the brown to the 
white envelope? 
Your final earnings will be Rs. 200 which is the amount in your brown envelope. 
What happens, if for example, you move 5 notes from the brown to the white 
envelope? 
Your final earnings will be the amount left in your brown envelope which is Rs. 
100, plus whatever amount is returned by your Type Y partner from the tripled amount 
you had sent. 
What happens, if for example, you move all 10 notes from the brown to the 
white envelope? 
Your final earnings will be whatever amount is returned by your Type Y partner 
from the tripled amount you had sent. 
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Appendix F: Type Y Subject Instruction for Investment Game 
Thank you for participating in today’s experiment. It will take up to 4 hours to 
finish the experiment.  
No talking allowed until the end of the experiment. If anyone is found 
trying to communicate with other participants, she/he will be declared disqualified. A 
disqualified participant will not receive any payment for this game. If you have any 
questions, or if you do not understand any rules of the game, please raise your hand. You 
will be personally attended to.  
Privacy: All your decisions will be kept confidential. No other participant 
will know about your decisions. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid in cash in 
private.  
Random Matching and Anonymity: You are a Type Y individual in this 
experiment. You will be randomly matched with a Type X participant for the 
experiment. However, at no point during the experiment will you know the identity of 
your partner. Your partner will also never know your identity.  
How will the Game Progress? 
Each Type X and Type Y participants will be handed a brown envelope containing 
10 notes of Rs. 20. At first, each Type X participant will go to an empty room and decide 
privately whether to keep all 10 notes or give some or all of them to their paired Type Y 
participant by moving them from the brown envelope to the white envelope. Every note 
that they transfer to the white envelope will be tripled by the experimenter. That is, 
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the experimenter will add Rs. 40 for every Rs. 20 note that they transfer to their Type Y 
partner. After all the Type X people have made their decisions, each Type Y people will 
receive the white envelope sent by their Type X partner containing the tripled amount. 
Then you will go to the empty room one by one and decide privately whether to return 
some, all or none of the tripled amount to your respective Type X partner by moving them 
from the white envelope to your original brown envelope. The amount that you leave in 
the white envelope will be the amount returned to your Type X partner. 
What will be Your Final Earnings from the Game? 
Your final earnings will be the total of the original amount in your brown envelope 
(Rs. 200) plus the amount you have moved from the white envelope. 
What happens, if for example, you move zero notes from the white to the 
brown envelope? 
Your final earnings will be the original amount in your brown envelope (Rs. 200). 
What happens, if for example, you move half the notes from the white to the 
brown envelope? 
Your final earnings will be the original amount in your brown envelope which is 
Rs. 200 plus half the amount sent by your Type X partner. 
What happens, if for example, you move all the notes from the white to the 
brown envelope? 
Your final earnings will be the original amount in your brown envelope which is 
Rs. 200 plus the entire amount sent by your Type X partner. 
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